100 YEN

A MONTHLY
FOR INDEPENDENT AND
PEACEFUL UNIFICATION

ONE KOREA



☆☆☆ Conflicting Points of Korean Unification Plans.

☆☆☆ History of Korean Unif. Movements

☆☆☆ Unification : An Economic Necessity

☆☆☆ Annals of Kor. Unification Proposals

☆☆☆ Declaration of Independent Unif.

NO. 1

JUNE 1961

Special Edition
introducing the
Korean Unifiction Problem

Our Aims and Demands

Liberation from Japanese Imperialism did not bring complete freedom and independence to Korea. Instead, the Big Powers of the world split the Korean territory and nation into two countries. And to this day, the Korean people have been suffering for sixteen long years under the most piteous and distressing conditions. Not only have we constantly wandered on the brinks of death, pressed by poverty and oppression, but we at last had to commit the most shameful mistake in our history: Incited by foreign powers, we Koreans engaged ourselves in the horrible task of killing our own brothers during that tragical Korean War. Yet, in spite of all these sufferings and injustices, the Korean people obediently held trust in the good faiths of the Big Powers, and solely believed that they would carve out the future of Korea for us.

But today we have finally realized our stupidity. We know well now that we must carve out our own destiny with our own hands, that is, the Korean nation must realize unification of Korea by the nation's own powers if it is willing to live. And the people's uprising in April last year which overthrew that most atrocious government of all times, the Syngman Rhee regime, without borrowing any aid from others, has given us the confidence that we can accomplish this aspiration.

We, as members of the Korean nation and campaigners for the unification movement, urged by such consciousness and confidence, propose here that our Independent and Peaceful Unification shall commence by conducting mutual contact and exchange between the North and South Korean people. Whereby, we are sure, brotherly love will be renewed and North and South negotiations invited; thus enabling concrete plans for unification to be worked out. We also believe that the unification must be not only the unification of the Korean territories but also of the divided nation. And in order to reflect the true will of the entire nation on the unification, we call for a Free General Elections to be held throughout North and South Korea; and through these elections, a Unified Central Government shall be established. From these standpoints, we demand:

1) *To immediately open up exchanges of letters, civilian travel, culture and trade between North and South Korea.*
2) *To convene at once an All-Korea Conference represented by delegates from the Governments, political parties and civil organizations of both Koreas, to study and work out the measures for preparing the All-Korea General Elections and establishing the Unified Central Government.*

We are convinced that these demands are fully legitimate, equitable and just since they are based on the standpoints of humanity, fundamental rights and the principle of self-determination. Still we cannot ignore the bearings which the Korean Unification problem has on the international relations. Thus emphasizing the original mission of the United Nations; respecting the authority of the 1954 Geneva Conference in which both the North and South Korean Delegations had participated, and acknowledging adoption of the Agreements reached at the said Conference, we request the nations concerned:

1) *To call as soon as possible an International Conference that shall further the accomplishments of the Political Conference on the Korean Question held at Geneva in 1954, and accelerate the Korean unification by assisting the independent unification movements of the Korean people.*
   Besides those nations which participated in the 1954 Conference, delegations from the four nations constituting the Korean Armistice Observation Commission (Switzerland, Sweden, Poland and Czechoslavakia) and India shall participate in the proposed Conference.
2) *All nations participating in this International Conference shall assume the responsibility to secure the peace in the Korean Peninsula and to guarantee the peaceful development of Unified Korea.*
   In order to secure these guarantees, the United States, the Soviet Union and all other countries shall immediately stop supplying weapons and all other military aids to the present Governments of North and South Korea; shall pledge to assist in the reconstruction of Korea on conditions of non-intervention in her internal affairs and also not to utilize Unified Korea as military bases; and shall recommend immediate membership of Unified Korea to the United Nations.
3) *The same nations shall also support, when requested, the projects of the Unification Projects Agency which will be established by tne All-Korea Confererecce, and also set up an International Supervision Commission to supervise the All-Korea General Elections which will be administered by the above Agency.*
   The International Supervision Commission shall be formed by nations that did not participate in the Korean War, but elected by the participating nations in the proposed International Conference and confirmed by the United Nations.
4) *The foreign armed forces stationed in Korea shall be replaced by International Police Forces ana evacuate Korea as soon as possible.*
   The International Police Forces shall be organized by troops from nations that did not participate in the Korean War; shall have missions to maintain the peace in Korea and also to secure an atmosphere in which free and fair elections can be enforced; and shall withdraw from Korea when requested by the Unified Korea Government.

Unification of Korea is a matter of life and death to the Korean people. No one, no nation should be allowed to bar our way. Therefore, we here appeal to the world to understand and to extend its support to our aims and demands.

ONE KOREA

A MONTHLY MAGAZINE OF NEWS AND VIEWS ON KOREAN UNIFICATION MOVEMENTS

June 1, 1961 Vol. I

INDEX

Our aims and demands (cover back)

A Word for "One Korea" ...(1)

The Conflicting points of Korean Unification Plans (2)

History of the Korean Unification Movement .....(10)

Voice of the Nation .....(17)
By Su Min-Ho
By Yu Byung-Mook

Why is it neccesary to Unification N & S Korea ? (20)

Editorials of Newspapers .....(32)

Proposals for Korean Unification.....(36)

Profile Su San-Il .....(48)

Declaration of Unification .....(51)

Current News .....(55)

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A Word for "One Korea"

The Korean nation had lived through thousands of years maintaining a single unity. Although our history is colored with constant aggressions by foreign forces and courageous struggles against them by our forefathers, Korea did not once give up her pride nor unity as a single nation.

However, the last World War brought unto us the most mortifying change. On the very day that the Korean Nation was liberated from the yoke of Japanese Imperialism, we were put on different shackles. The Big Powers, against our great aspirations and profound indignations, wantonly splitted our nation into two countries.

This unwelcomed division into two Koreas not only undermined the progress of our nation, but eventually brought along that Great Tradegy in which the Korean people had to kill each other against our will.

The war clouds have long passed away from our skies but two Koreas still remain. And whatever the causes may have been for which the world had fought and shed it's blood there, wouldn't the tradegy be too merciless, if the people who had suffered so much under the gunfires, must eventually perish as victims of the ever prolonging cold war rivalry between the Big Powers? Yes, since we remain divided into two Koreas, hardships, tragedies and despairs are mounting upon us and our very existence as a nation is endangered.

The Korean people, North and South alike, wish Korea to be reunified. It is all clear to us that divided we shall fall and united alone will there be any future to us. Korea must be reunified into one nation. This is the supreme command of the nation and the reason why we have willingly posted "One Korea" as the title of our periodical.

Throughout the 16 years since division, the Korean people have been perpetually calling for unification. We have continuously appealed to the Big Powers too, but they have not lent us their ears. The 16 years have taught us that unification of Korea shall only be realized through independent actions on the Korean people's part. And today, Koreans, whether North or South, are swiftly gathering under the slogan of "Independent and Peaceful Unification," determined to accomplish this great yearning at all costs.

Still unification of Korea is not a problem concerning the Korean people alone. As long as Korea remains divided, there are dangers of another Korean War breaking out. So it should also be the common wish of all peace loving nations of the world.

We are issuing this periodical with hopes that the world would note and understand the true positions and aspirations of the Korean people. We intend to offer only the truth, committed to an independent position dedicated only to the interests of the Korean Nation and biased towards no specific interest whether political, class or ideological.

Reunification back into "One Korea" is the greatest challenge we Koreans face in our long history. But without international support, we shall never attain that goal. Therefore, we solicit the peace-loving people of the world and the Big Powers as well to renew their understanding towards us and extend their support to our cause.

THE CONFLICTING POINTS OF KOREAN UNIFICATION PLANS

Their Clarification and Adjustment

Contents

I Preface: Nature of the Korean Unification Problem
II Differences in Opinions Between the Rival Camps
  A. Formulas for Unification
  B. Conflicting Points
  C. Factors Deterring Compromise
III Adjusting the Differences
  A. Principles
  B. Details
    a. Election Administration Body
    b. Supervision of the Elections
    c. Evacuation of Foreign Forces
    d. Security After Unification
IV Conclusion: Determination and Desires of the Korean Nation

I. Preface

—Nature of the Korean Unification Problem—

As generally known, the Allied Powers during World War II pledged in their Cairo Declaration of 1943 to give Korea her independence at the termination of the War and this promise was reconfirmed by the Moscow Declaration issued at the end of the Tri-Power Foreign Ministers' Conference held in December, 1945 at Moscow. (refer to page 10) The Korean independence promised and reconfirmed by these Declarations definitely did not signify such an distorted independence as we are putting up with today, being influenced by foreign powers and having two divided governments. It was slated to be an independence based on the principle of national self-determination which has become the basis of the new international order in the postwar world. It was also to be an autonomous independence bestowed on the Korean nation which had struggled so much under the yoke of Japanese Imperialism.

Deprived of such promises, Korea has been gasping for sixteen long years since that day we should have been given our complete independence, under such unexpected conditions as having our territory and nation cut in two. On this account, Koreans have lived all these years in sheer anguish over their parents, children, brothers and sisters lost to them beyond the 38th parallel. They are still bereft of the freedom to write to—let alone see—each other! And unable to mutually benefit from the country's resources (agriculture centered in the South and manufacturing leaned to the North), the Korean people have suffered tremendously under unprecedented economic distresses. But this was not the end. Instigated by foreign powers, the peace loving Koreans who have never gone beyond their borders to invade another country, had to go through that great tragedy of killing amongst each other during the Korean War. What could have been more terrible!

From these disasters, however, Koreans have learned big lessons. The first lesson is that we must, at all costs, attain unification if we are to gain any happiness. And if we shan't win unification, we would be living as beggars always beseeching foreign charities. The second lesson is that Koreans must not look to foreign powers but should resolve all our problems by our ownselves, and that not by force but through peaceful means. In other words, these lessons which we learned so bitterly, convinced us that unification must be our most urgent and biggest task, which we must accomplish, independently and peacefully, without any intervention of foreign powers.

This, of course, does not mean that we are going to completely ignore the bearings which the Korean unification problem has on the international relations. We, on the contrary, hope that the Big Powers connected with this problem would reconsider the unhappiness and menace which the present divided state of Korea is wreaking on the Korean people and co-operate in the job of unifying Korea in line with the principle of self-determination.

But the co-operation must, by no means, be intervention in Korean internal affairs. In view of the arbitrariness being displayed by the Big Powers in the name of co-operation, it must be emphasized that the subjectivity of the unification belongs strictly to the Korean people. In this sense, we would be inclined to regard the Big Power which will first cease its intervention in Korean affairs as our best friend like that boy who confronted by two mothers at King Solomon's court of justice, leaned towards the mother who showed real love by loosening her hold in the tug of war. Yet, we are not bent on unilaterally denying the interests which foreign powers possess in the unification problem. For, if we should do so, we would be throwing away the lessons which we had to go through bloodshed in order to learn, and furthermore, we would be ignoring the true nature of the Korean unification problem which would erect a milestone on the road towards would peace once resolved.

Thus, we keenly feel that unification of Korea must commence by conducting negotiations between North and South Korea and be accomplished through the adjustment of international interests and differences in views on the unification. And, by the way, are there ways in which we can adjust the conflicting interests and opinions between North and South Korea and also those between the East and West? Let us now review the unification plans proposed by the two rival parties, and through examination of their conflicting points and the interests twined round them, let us hammer out the ways for adjustment.

II. Differences in Opinions Between the Rival Camps

Although the 1954 Geneva Peace Conference held in accordance with the Armistice Agreement reached at Panmunjom did not work out a final decision on the formula for Korean unification, it did make great headway towards an international solution of the problem. For, in spite of the stubborn resistance on the South Korean side, backed by the United States, the conference spelled out the basic principle to "hold All-Korea general elections for unification based on a proportional representation." And, in spite of continued maneuvering by the United States to scrap this principle, it is still strictly observed as an established fact by all the Sixteen Participant Nations which sent troops to the United Nations Forces in the Korean War as well as the United Nations itself. Compared to Germany where no such agreement is in sight, Korea could be said way ahead toward the common goal of unification.

However, seven years have passed since the Geneva Conference and still the elections have not been held, just because that differences of opinions on a few points pertaining to the procedures of the elections cannot be adjusted. Now what exactly are these points and what are the causes that such differences of opinion cannot be adjusted? Let us first examine the diverse points of both sides.

A. Formulas for Unification

The opinions of the Sixteen Participant Nations are comprised in the "Fourteen Points" Plan (refer to page 36) which the South Korean Delegation submitted to the Conference as its final proposal. Here, we will just extract the following points.

1. In order to establish a united, independent and democratic Korea, free elections shall be held under the supervision of the United Nations and in accordance with the resolutions adopted by the United Nations.
2. Free elections shall be held in North Korea where such elections were impossible heretofore. The same elections shall also be held in South Korea in accordance with the provisions provided in the Constitution of the Republic of Korea.
3. The Chinese People's Voluntary Army shall complete its evacuation one month prior to the election date. The gradual withdrawal of the United Nations Forces may be commenced before the day of election, but their evacuation shall not be completed until the United Korean Government establishes effective control over its territory and the United Nations guarantees that fact.

On the other hand the essence of the Soviet proposal (submitted on June 5) introduced to the same conference with explanations that it comprised the views of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Chinese People's Republic as well as the United Kingdom proposal (submitted: May 13) was:

1. All-Korea free elections based on proportional representation shall be held within six months throughout the territory of Korea.
2. For the purpose of organizing and enforcing the All-Korea free elections, an All-Korea Committee composed of representatives of both Koreas shall be set up.
3. All foreign forces must evacuate Korea prior to the commencement of the elections.
4. An International Commission shall be established for the purpose of supervising the All-Korea elections.
5. The powers which possess the greatest interests in maintaining peace in the Far East must realize the necessity to share the responsibilities to safeguard the peaceful development of Korea.

B. Conflicting Points

Since Point 1 of the Soviet proposal is covered by the "Fourteen Points" of the South Korean proposal (submitted: May 22), differences of opinion exist on four points, namely: 1) election administration body 2) election supervision agency 3) evacuation of foreign forces and 4) security measures after unification. Concerning election administration body, the United Nations asked for an organ that would function "in accordance with the procedures provided by the constitution of the Republic of Korea; whereas the Communists insisted on an "All-Korea Committee composed of representatives of both Koreas." As to who should act as the supervising agency, the "United Nations claimed that the "United Nations" itself should take over the responsibility, while the Communists proposed to set up an "International Commission." (It should be recalled here that the Communist China Prime Minister, Chuo En-lai, amplified this point by stating that Neutral Supervision Commission or the standing Korean Truce Observation Commision would also be sufficient. To this statement, the British Delegation expressed its consent.) In regards to the evacuation of foreign forces, the United Nations insisted that "the Communist Chinese Forces complete their exacuation prior to the elections and United Nations Forces complete theirs after the elections," to which the Communists countered by asking for "All foreign forces must withdraw prior to the elections." (The Chinese People's Voluntary Army completed its withdrawal from North Korea during 1958, so now the United Nations Forces are solely concerned.) And finally, on the issue of security measures after unification, the United Nations proposed "security assured by the United Nations"; whereas the Communists placed the responsibility on "the powers interested in maintaining peace in the Far East."

C. Factors Deterring Compromise

Now that we have pinned down the exact points where the East and West views differ, let us next explore the factors that have kept the rival camps from reaching a compromise on the differences. Three main factors are notable here. The first factor is the obstinate attitudes of both North and South Korean governments which persist in seeking territorial expansion at the expense of the other, calculating that such measure can strengthen their positions. Secondly, it can be said that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union is free from fear of the blow they might have to take, politically and stategically, if either of the Koreas went over to the other side.

And lastly, it must be admitted that both the United States and the Soviet Union had their own internal reasons to keep up the tension in Korea.

However, they no longer feel such need. This would be obvious if we would take one good look at the present day situation of the two camps. On the eve of the outbreak of of the Korean War, Kremlin was threatened by a split up within its own camp, for Yugoslavia had just broken away from the Communist bloc. Thus it was considered that the Korean War was needful to Kremlin for the purpose of tightening its hold on the Communist world. But the Communist world of today, led by Moscow which is putting in an all-out effort to get its Seven Years Plan accomplished and backed by other socialist countries with their respective development plans, have spurned the use of war as a means for Communist expansion and have carried the fight into the economic sphere. This Peaceful Co-existence challenge has already marked significant blows on the capitalist world. For instance, when Soviet Premier, Khrushchev announced his plans to visit the United States, the sharp fall in the New York Stock exchange registered a total price fall of 5.5 billion dol-

lars! So we may conclude here that the Communist have no intention of creating tentions in Korea any more.

For America, the Korean War truly provided a new opportunity for expansion to the American defense industries which had bulged tremendously during World War II. A U.S. Congressional Report published in the summer of 1959, testified that such vast amount of supplies as automatic rifle munitions which could'nt be used up in forty years and uniforms enough for thirty years stocked up in Korea! However, the U.S. defense industries no longer dream of making money by capitalizing in Korea. As nuclear weapons and missiles have come to the forefront now, the old time installations of the last war have become totally obsolete. And it is high time that the U.S. defense industries make their changeover to production of other products or divert their interests to better markets than Korea if they hope to keep alive!

So, we have only two main obstacles remaining which bar our way for unification. The both Governments of North and South Korea are suspicious that they might lose power if All-Korea elections were held now. So they are reluctant to take any real action in that direction. But under whatever conditions the elections may be held, one party is bound to bow out as the loser. And if things turn out differently, a new government of a totally different nature might come into being. Thus there isn't much sense in being so cautious at the very outset of the problem.

Neverthless, the present government officials are carrying on a stubborn resistance against elections for unification by putting forth uncompromising conditions. But however stubborn they may be, the measure to clear away such obstacles is extremely simple. For, once the foreign powers pulling the strings get in the mood, it would be as easy as turning one's own hand to change the minds of the present rulers of divided Korea. At the Geneva Conference one word from the U.S. was enough to change the minds of the South Korean Delegation into agreeing on an All-Korea general election plan. And when free of foreign intervention, the Korean people can oust their rulers who would reject unification any time, just as they overthrew the Rhee regime last year.

Thus, we arrive at the conclusion that the biggest and basic factor which bars our way for a unified Korea is the conflicting political and strategical interest which the U.S. and the Soviets have in Korea. Both countries fear the political loss and strategical blow they would have to suffer in case the Korean Peninsula goes over to the opposite camp. So neither country is willing to sacrifice an inch of Korean territory to the other.

However, in view of the rapid development of long range missiles, the strategic value of the Korean Peninsula is rapidly diminishing. According to U.S. defense plans, Korea will still serve as an advanced base until sometime around 1962. This is mostly because the United States still lagging behind the Soviets in getting out intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), will have to rely on medium and short-ranged missiles deployed on advanced bases for the time being. There is no doubt that the Soviets, and, of course, the Chinese Communists wouldn't just stand there and watch if the Korean Peninsula were going into the hands of the Americans. Still the strategic value of Korea must have equally diminished in the eyes of the Communists too, when compared to the Korean War period. And before long Korea may become worthless to the defense of all these countries. Therefore we can say that the present U.S. vs. Soviet conflict over Korea is more due to political reasons than military needs.

III. Adjusting the Differences

Since we have observed the internal and external factors that hinder our way towards a United Korea and have clarified the diverse points between the proposals of North and South Korea, let us see if we can find ways of removing the barriers and adjusting the differences.

A. Principles

As we have seen above, the real deterring factor that keeps us back from realizing our sincere desire is the conflicting interests that the United States and the Soviet Union have in Korea. This indicates that the only way to remove this deterring factor would be to adjust the conflicting interests of these two countries. How can this adjustment be done? Theoretically, we can think up numerous methods. But practicable plans are not many. It seems that the best idea would be to dis-

engage the Korean Peninsula from both the East and West camps and keep the U.S. and the Soviets from utilizing Korea strategically and exercising its political influences on Korea. In other words, the two powers must not use Korea as military bases nor intervene in Korean domestic affairs. However we must distinguish foreign aid from intervention in domestic affairs. Aids from the U.S. and the Soviets as well as from other advanced nations of both camps are quite requisite to a newly born United Korean Nation.

However, mere declaration of such measures by the Americans and the Soviets will not suffice. The measures would also require guarantees by all the nations neighboring on Korea or having any kind of relationship with Korea and, moreover, recognition by the United Nations and the United Nations General Assembly is required. And only when all this is attained, will Korea be safe from being utilized as military bases, aggression, occupation, and intervention by the U.S. or the U.S.S.R. or any other power.

If the conflicting interests of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. as well as those other powers of the two camps are adjusted in this manner, the job to smooth out the differences on methods for the All-Korea elections should be comparatively simple. But if any of the powers would still selfishly persist in exercising its influence on Korea, in face of the Korean people's desire to stand by the principle of self-determination, plenty of disorder and confusion is liable to ensue.

Therefore, we should bear such possibilities in mind and hammer out a reasonable and practicable election plan, so that neither side would persist in attaining unreasonable demands. But at the same time, we must take care from getting over-practical just for the sake of squeezing out a stopgap compromise plan. The plan must have great visions envisaging the future of the Korean Nation and also lofty ideals by which the nation shall contribute to the world. For in this way alone can we attain support of world opinion and sweep away the egoisms of the North and South Korean Governments as well as those of the East and Western powers.

B. Details

Now let us go into the details of adjustment.

a. Election Administration Body

The South Korean Plan insists on an election in accordance with the procedures provided by the Constitution of the Republic of Korea! We must say that there couldn't be a more insincere proposal. It totally defies the essentials of a United Korea. If a United Korea is to bring forth the establishment of a newly united central government which will absorb—and dissolve—the present North and South Korean Governments, only a fool would demand that the unified government should be established through elections held in accordance with the constitution that is bound to be scrapped! There is nothing in this proposal worth reviewing except that it does serve as an evidence to prove the kind of attitude the South Korean Delegation took at the Geneva Conference and also the fact that Syngman Rhee Regime was always against peaceful unification of Korea. It is truly regrettable that the present Chang Government should hang on to this unreasonable formula.

The North Korean Delegation proposed at the beginning of the Geneva Conference (April 27, 1954) a plan for a "Recovery of National Unity and All-Korea Free Elections" According to this plan, a democratic election law is to be drafted which would enforce a general election to be held in a free atmosphere by devising necessary measures to assure freedom of assembly and expression to all electors and candidates. An All-Korea Committee composed by representatives from both North and South Korea is also to be set up.

At first, the plan did not make clear by what ratio the All-Korea Committee was to be constituted and did leave doubts whether a committee composed by representatives from both sides could function smoothly or not, but as a whole, it was an agreeable plan being based on the principle of self-determination and having practical election administration measures. There are voices calling for elections under direct administration of the United Nations or other international organizations, but such an election is contrary to the principle of self-determination. And self-determination is not only the acquired results but it must also be the process by which one gets to the results. Moreover, it would simply be impossible to organize and operate a big

job like an election administration body all by the hands of foreigners. If the United Nations is to limit its administration to the central part of the body, an effective administration cannot be expected. It should be recalled that South Korean general elections held on May 10, 1948 was supervised by the United Nations all right but since the supervision was limited to a very small area, it did not amount to an effective supervision.

Now let us get back to the North Korean proposal. On a later date of the conference, Communist China Prime Minister, Chou En-lai proposed to set up an Election Supervision Commision with tasks "to support and observe the functions of the All-Korea Committee in order to overcome the difficulties that it might run into in enforcing All-Korea general elections." This plan was enough to remove one's doubts about "smooth operation of the committee." However, when North Korean Foreign Minister, Nam Il made clear that the All-Korea Committee would be composed of equal representation from both Koreas, the picture became clouded again. For this line of thought indicated that the North Koreans were contemplating equal representation for the composition of the United Assembly too. The illogicality was immediately pointed out at that time. But this ended in over-anxiousness, for the North Koreans later proposed a proportional representation plan for the United National Assembly.

Well it seems now that the only difficulty remaining in this plan is the problem concerning equal representation for the All-Korea Committee. It is truly illogical that North Korea which has no more than half the population of South Korea should have the same number of representatives. The Western Delegates did have good reason when they criticized this point. But this would be looking only at the surface of the matter. Full grasp of the problem is wanted. For, All-Korea general elections is something more than mere merger of the two Korean countries. The elections will hear the will of the whole Korean nation and establish a unified government which will absorb and dissolve the present North and South Korean Governments. Thus, there wouldn't be much need for the present regimes to fight over the number of representatives.

From this standpoint, the All-Korea Committee should be composed by persons who really represent the people instead of the representatives that the Governments or National Assemblies might elect. This would necessitate another general election to choose the representatives for the All-Korea Committee. Then we would need an election administration body for that election too. Since there would be no end to this if we go on in this manner, we will make a practical proposal here: Both National Assemblies shall elect the equal number of representatives in proportion to the present break-down of their respective political parties. According to this plan, the principle of equal representation will serve as a mutual check and prevent tyranny on either side. And if election administration committees at the lower level are constituted and operated properly, the interests of the political parties that will not be represented at the All-Korea Committee can be protected to a certain extent. (In case split in opinions arise between the North and South representatives, there still should be no fear of the Committee being paralized, for the International Supervision Comission is there to make the necessary adjustments.)

b. Supervision of the Elections

Two plans are put forth in connection with election supervision. One is to be supervised by the United Nations and the other by Neutral Powers. From the standpoint of the Korean nation, there are spaces for compromise. Although the problem is being argued from practical angles, essentially, it has its roots deep in the East and West rivalry. The 16 Participant Nations led by the U.S. insist-that the United Nations shall act as the supervisor. This is a matter of prestige to them. They must show the world that they were the real victors of the Korean War. The Communists led by the Soviets have put forth a counter proposal, demanding a set up of a Neutral Supervision Commission. And they too want the world to acknowledge the fact that the Communists were not the losers. Since the Korean Problem is being exploited for political cold war purposes in such a manner, we must find a compromise solution that will save the faces of both camps without inflicing big damages on world politics.

The United Nation is the only present world organization that embraces both the East and

West blocs. It alone can remove the obstacles that lie before mankind's march towards world unity. So despite its defects, the best way to resolve the Korean unification problem is to resort to the United Nations. But unfortunately reality isn't as simple as that. From the very moment the 16 participant Nations that organized the United Nations Forces signed the truce pact with the Communists, they became no longer agents to resolve international disputes but mere opponents of a war. This fact has given rise to such charges that one can no longer expect a fair supervision from the United Nations. This is partly why the Communists proposed an supervision commission to be constituted by neutral powers which did not participate in the Korean War. But this idea to hold the elections completely detached from the United Nations would be too short in foresight. It would be all right to have neutral powers observe the elections, but the presence of the United Nations is absolutely necessary. For through the United Nations alone can an unified Korea obtain guarantee of its security and be recognized as a full-fledged member of the international society.

So this is our conclusion: First we must establish the principle designating the United Nations as supervisor of the elections, then we should work out a fair election supervision fomula that will be agreeable to the Communists too. Moreover, the Soviet Union is one of the most powerful members of the UN and Communist China is aspiring to be admitted to this world organization. And when we recall the fact that Great Britain and France had proposed "International Election Supervision" (British Foreign Minister, Eden on May 13, 1954) and "Neutral Election Supervision", French Foreign Minister, Bidau on same day) at the Geneva Conference, we are sure that this is not an impossibility.

c. Evacuation of Foreign Forces

The Chinese People's Voluntary Army completed evacuating North Korea during 1958, So the problem of evacuation concerns only the United Nations Forces.

The Communists have issued strong requests to the UN Forces to pull out, but the Americans are "continuing their occupation to maintain peace" under the pretext that the dangers of war have not been eliminated from the Korean area. The South Koreans insist on completion of the withdrawal of UN Forces after Korean unification is realized. Continued stationing of forces that fought the Korean War deters the promotion of Korean unification and offers a threat to fair elections. In this sense we demand an early evacuation of foreign forces.

Still we cannot help dreading the bad effects which may ensue when the UN Forces pull out. For though the presence of UN Forces in South Korea provides factors creating tensions, it also serves as a check on the belligerents who are in wait for an opportunity to make use of their giant armies. As both the North and South Korean Governments confront each other with their respective incongrous armies of some 500,000 to 700,000 men, we must think up a safeguard to prevent the worst from happening. Of course we have an Armistice Observation Commission. But this Commission would be powerless on such emergencies. Neither can we expect voluntary dissolution of the two armies before an agreement is reached on the elections for unification nor will the dissolution be possible during the period from the time an agreement is reached until the date the elections will be held. (According to the agreement reached at the Geneva Conference, the period will be six months.)

This brings us to the plan to replace the present UN Forces stationed in Korea by an International Police Force composed of troops from neutral powers that did not participate in the Korean War. This International Police Force, as a rule, will be stationed within the Neutral Truce Zone, but when necessary, it will have the authority to move into any area of both North and South Korea. And it will also possess the mission to support the activities of the Armistice Observation Commission as well as that of the Election Supervision Commission which is to be set up. Not until they are backed by such a force will the Armistice Observation Commission and the Election Supervision Commission function smoothly. Finally, this International Police Force will not evacuate Korea until a unified central government established through the unification elections has consolidated its sovereignty and secured the order of the land and unless requested to evacuate by the same government.

d. Security after Unification

International guarantee is essential in order to secure a peaceful development for United Korea. Both Governments of Korea, all the powers of East and West blocs have acknowledged this point. So agreement on this question has practically been reached. And when we combine the plans of both sides, we can attain a complete security for United Korea.

When unification is realized, United Korea must at first be guaranteed by the powers who will have a hand in that work, her peace, democratic development and economic recovery. This measure is necessary because a power like Communist China who will share a big role in bringing about a unified Korea is shut out from the U.N. However, assurances only by these nations is not sufficient. Unified Korea needs to become a member of the Unified Nations Organization. She must be acknowledged her legitimate rights as a member of international society. In other words, United Korea must be guaranteed her rights by the U.N. The question of admission of Unified Korea into the U.N. must not be mixed up with that of Communist China: The unification of Korea should be realized before the admission of Communist China into the U.N. And probably Unified Korea might get there before Communist China.

IV. Conclusion:—Determination and Desires of the Korean Nation

We have thus far noted the differences of views on the Korean unification program bebetween North and South Korea and also between the East and West. We have also observed the basic principles of adjusting these differences and found out that adjustments were truly possible. The next problems then, are whether the Korean people have the will and capability to carry out such adjustments and therefore, realize unification by themselves or not; and also whether we can maintain the unification or not.

From the very day that Korea was split into two countries, the Korean people rose in protest against the 38th Parallel and demanded its abolishment. Then we demonstrated against the establishment of seperate governments in both areas. When the Korean War came, Koreans bravely made their way through gunfire to the other side and appealed for peaceful unification of the fatherland. And now we are vigorously campaigning to accomplish the task of independent and peaceful unification (Refer to page 10) and lastly, we must emphasize the historic event last year when the Korean people, with no help whatsoever from any nation, neither the U.S. nor the United Nations, brought down the Rhee regime which had been the greatest stumbling block for independent and peaceful unification. This event, we believe, is sufficient in testifying for our will and capability of realizing unification.

As to whether we can maintain the unification or not, we think, to hold such suspicion itself is—over anxiousness. For once we are reunified and the present wartime system abolished, Korea can fully sustain her economy through the diligence of the people and utilization of her natural resources. (Refer to page 20) And moreover, our desire for independence can be compared to any nation since we have experienced so much bitterness and hardships under long foreign rule. From such confidence and desire, Koreans will never again let foreign powers intervene in our internal affairs or built their military bases on our soil. This firm determination of the Korean people, we think, should be enough to relieve the Big Powers of their fears that in the process of unification, Korea might go over to the other side and inflict damages on them.

We would like to reiterate that unification is a matter of life or death to the Korean nation and should not be prolonged another day. And furthermore, from the standpoint of self-determination and world peace, it must not be shelved again. Each and every year, the Big Powers have played around with the Korean problem. As we see in their attitudes at the United Nations, the Big Powers are always evading their responsibilities. The Korean people can no longer put up with such sabotage.

After suffering 15 long years under the waywardness of the Big Powers, the Korean people have determined to resolve the problem with our own hands and have risen to unify Korea independently. We are also calling to the world to note our positions and situation, and are placing our demands before the international public at the same time. (Refer to the back of cover page) We are sure that no one has the right to ignore or oppose these demands and appeals of the Korean people.

HISTORY OF THE KOREAN UNIFICATION MOVEMENT

Fifteen Years of Struggle Unfolded by the Korean People to Gain Independent and Peaceful Unification of Our Fatherland

I. Movements for Abolishment of the 38th Parallel
II. Movements Against Separate Elections in South Korea
III. Movements for 'Peaceful Unification"
IV. Movements for "Independent Unification"

THE 15 years the Korean nation has tread since that day we were liberated from the Japanese Imperialists, have been a hard and struggling road. The 38th Parallel which was initiated as a military zone to disarm the Japanese Imperial Army, became a permanent frontier cutting Korea into two countries. This division of the Korean territory and nation made us confront the greatest crisis in our history. And here began our long struggle towards abolishment of the 38th Parallel and unification of our territory and nation. There were such dark days as the Korean War, but now we can see brightness shining before us. The days of our hardships have reached the final stage. An atmosphere, internal as well as external, demanding resolution of the Korean Unification Problem has been created. The time for our unification is ripe. As we are sure that this problem which bears so wide and important an effect on international politics, is bound to arrive at its climax in not so far-off future, we would like the world to note the traces which the Korean people have left behind in our struggle for unification.

The 15 years' history of the Korean unification movement can be divided into the following four stages:

1) 1945-47; movements centered on abolishment of the 38th Parallel.
2) 1948; movements against seperate general elections for South Korea.
3) 1959-60; period of "peaceful unification movements".
4) 1960—today; period of "independent unification movements".

Movements for Abolishment of 38th Parallel

In August and September, 1945, the U.S. and the Soviet forces occupied South and North Korea respectively, setting, in accordance with the Yalta Secret Agreements, the 38th Parallel as the military zone dividing the two occupational forces. The zone was slated to be abolished as soon as the Japanese Army was disarmed, but quick turns in post-war policies of the U.S. and the Soviet Union came to show signs of the zone being perpetuated. Immediate calls for abolishing the 38th Parallel arose. On September 19, 1945, the Nationalist Party, composed of moderate nationalists, handed a resolution to General Donglas MacArthur, then Supreme Commander of the Far East Allied Forces, requesting the abolishment of the 38th Parallel. Following this move, thirty-eight political parties, including both the left and right, of South Korea discussed the same matter on Oct. 10th of the same year and issued a joint statement demanding immediate abolishment of the 38th Parallel and termination of the North-South division.

Considering such voices among the Korean people, General Hodges, then Commander of the U.S. Occupation Forces issued a statement on Nov. 27th, clarifying that the U.S. and the Soviet Union were con-

ferring in Moscow on the problem of abolishing the 38th Parallel and establishing a united government in Korea. And on Jan. 2, 1946, Major General Arnold, Chief of the U.S. Military Government in Korea, stated that a provisional government of Korea can be set up within a months' time after the abolishment of the 38th Parallel is agreed on. However, these statements by front line commanders did not reflect the official policies of the White House; for on Dec. 27, 1945, the Foreign Ministers of U.S., United Kingdom and U.S.S.R. signed the Moscow Agreement which designated a Five-Year Trusteeship Plan for Korea. And according to this Agreement, a U.S.-Soviet Conference was held on Jan. 16, 1946 which decided to set up a U.S.-Soviet Joint Commission in Seoul with the aim to establish a provisional united government in Korea. The meetings of the Joint Commission was convened on March 20th, but could not produce any concrete results. On the contrary, sharp conflicts between the two powers immediately reflected on the local political scene where the leftists supporting the trusteeship clashed head on with the rightists who opposed the plan. With the rightist joining the "National Political Emergency Conference" and the leftists rallying under the "South Korean Democratic National Front", the antogonism deepened. Thus the tide of events ran against the hopes of the people for unification. And finally, on May 6th, the Joint Commission adjourned indefinitely.

NEVERTHELESS, the Korean people staged a "National Rally for the Korean Independence Front " on May 12th and appealed to the country and abroad for immediate abolishment of the 38th Parallel and establishment of a unified Korean government. In July, left-right collaboration was negotiated by such leaders as Mr. Lyuh-un-yohng (leftist) and Dr. Kim-Kyushik (rightest) but breaches between the two forces had already gone beyond the point of reconciliation. In December, the U.S. Military Government urged the set up of the Provisional Legislature of Korea and in June, 1947, established the Provisional Government of South Korea. Meanwhile, in North Korea, the Korean Workers' Party was formed and under the guidance of the Soviet Occupation Forces, rapid social reforms like land reform were carried out and in February, 1946, the Provisional Peoples' Committee was officially established. The tide of events ran in the direction of strengthening the North-South division of Korea.

The U.S.-Soviet Joint Commission was reopened on May 11, 1947, but being held in such an atmosphere, it soon ran into a deadlock again. On September 21, the United States submitted the Korean problem to the 2nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly. In November 14, the General Assembly adopted a resolution to create a Temporary Commission on Korea and subsequently, dispatched nine nation-membered Commission to Seoul but it was unable to enter North Korea. Based on the Commissions' reports, the Interim Committee decided to hold general elections in such parts of Korea as were possible and directed the Commission to enforce elections only in South Korea. This decision virtually scrapped the Moscow Agreement, whereby the U.S.-Soviet Joint Commission lost its functioning and all joint efforts by the two powers to set up a united government in Korea were abandoned, thus the hopes and movements of the Korean people to abolish the 38th Parallel and to set up a unified Korean government collapsed.

Movements Against Separate Elections in South Korea

THE United Nations' decision to hold general elections only in South Korea literally shocked the nation. The movements headed for a unified government now concentrated their forces to halt these elections. Not only leftist organizations but conscientious nationalists also joined the ranks. Such rightist leaders like Mr. Kimku, who had fought so many years for Korean independence eventually serving as the head of the Provisional Korean Gov-

Kim Ku

ernment exiled in Chungking, China, and Dr. Kim-Kyushik, then Chairman of the Provisional Korean Legislature, took the lead in the anti-elections movements. On February 6, 1948, these two leaders submitted the following proposal to the U.N Korean Commission:

1) The U.S. and U.S.S.R. troops shall simultaneously withdraw from Korea.
2) The political leaders of North and South Korea shall hold negotiations after the withdrawal.
3) General elections shall be held in consequence to the North-South negotiations.

And furthermore, these leaders sent a letter to North-South conference.

In line with these movements, the leading nationalist parties, the National Independence Union and the Korean Independence Party made clear their attitudes to boycott the elections. And in the southern most island of Chejudo an armed uprising against the elections broke out on April 3rd.

Meanwhile, the North Koreans accepted the proposal of Kim-Kyshik calling for a Joint Conference of All-Korea Political and Civil Organizations (Conference for North-South Negotiations) to be opened on April 19th in Pyongyang. Fifty-eight political and civil organizations sent delegates to this Conference and such nationalist leaders like Kim-ku, Kim-Kyusik, Cho Bong-Am, Jo-Wanku crossed the 38th Parallel and participated in the North-South negotiations. After five days of discussion, the Conference issued an appeal to be sent to the U.S. and the Soviet Union which concluded as follows:

"The Joint Conference of All-Korea Political and Civil Organizations requests the Governments of the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic to take such measures that will implement the simultaneous withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korean; enable the Korean people to hold free democratic elections throughout the territory without any foreign intervention, and establish Korea as a unified democratic nation; and also make possible our fatherland to secure its national independence and become a equal member of the international society of freedom loving nations."

DESPITE such oppositions both in North and South Korea, the proposed elections were enforced on May 10th, as scheduled, under strict guard of the military and police forces. In Chejudo, two districts out of three could not cast their votes due to armed resistance which was a fair example indicating the fierceness of the opposition.

Nevertheless, as consequences of the elections, the Republic of Korean Government was established on August 15th, and Dr. Syngman Rhee was elected the First President of the Republic. Immediately following these events, the North Koreans carried out elections on August 25th and the Government of Democratic People's Republic of Korea was set up on September 8th. The setting up of these two governments, backed by the U.S. and Soviet Union respectively, perpetuated the division of the Korean territory and nation. The South Korean Government strengthened it's ties with the United States through the conclusion of such treaties as Korean-U.S. Minutual Defense Agreement, Korean-U.S. Economic Agreement, etc. The North Korean Government, on the other hand, tightened its relations with the Soviet Union by signing Korean-Soviet Eco-

nomic and Cultural Agreements.

Still the Korean people carried on their struggle in South Korea. The riot in Chejudo continued and the Government sent an armed forces of 13,000 men to quell the riot. But on October 20th, the army itself turned into revolt and joining hands with students and civilians carried on fierce street fightings. Not until the end of the year were the riots finally subdued. The nationalists who participated in the North-South Conference also carried their calls for withdrawal of all foreign forces and put forth efforts to set up a unfied government through All-Korea general elections but such movements did not bear fruit.

The U.N. Korean Commission submitted a report to the General Assembly requesting the continued stationing of American Forces in South Korea. However, a notable event happened here. Pressed by conscientious nationalist members of the ROK Assembly and the Korean people, the U.S. Armed Forces pulled out of Korea in June, 1948. ~~In accordance with this resolution, the U.S. forces withdrew from Korea in June, 1949.~~ Still the U.S. Military Advisory Commission remained and Syngman Rhee tightened his dictatorial machine by jailing twelve representatives including Vice-Speaker, Kim Yack-Soo, who led the Assembly into adopting the resolution requesting the U.S. forces to withdraw. So for the time being, the Korean peoples' drive to gain a unified Korea ran aground.

Movements for "Peaceful Unification"

The unification movement entered a new stage as the two Korean Governments became permanently fixed. The years between 1950 to 1960 were the most distressing. On June 25th, 1950, the Korean War broke out and brought on the Korean nation an unprecedented tradegy. The War came to a close on June 27, 1953 but three years of horrible warfare planted deep mutual distrust and hostile feelings between the two Koreas, making unification ever difficult.

Yet the movements did not die. Two different governments on one Korean peninsula was difinitely against the will of the people. And drives to revise this distortion took various forms. The bellicose rulers of South Korea still devised schemes to conquer the North with force, to which the people resisted persistently. Those nationalists who had opposed the separate elections for South Korea, led by Kim-ku and Kim-Kyusik formed a "Preparatory Committee for North-South Unification" and continued their drive to set up a unified Korean government through independent efforts by the Koreans themselves. But crack down on such movements were bound to come. Kim-ku was assassinated by a soldier who was believed to have been instigated by the Rhee regime and the Independence Party led by Kim was liquidated.

In the very midst of the Korean War, nationalist leader, Choe Ik-hwan (deceased) made his way through gunfire to North Korea, proposed immediate ceasefire and peace negotiations between the two Korean Governments and at the same time appealed for peaceful unification of the country. His efforts were later succeeded by the reformist Progressive Party. This party which was formed in the Autumn of 1955 when the despotism of the Rhee regine was tightening it's hold on the country, set the party's final goal on peaceful unification of Korea. In 1956, the Progressive Party proposed a "Peaceful Unificaton Plan" which received vigorous support of the people. This plan rejected the unification-by-force plan of the Rhee regime and called for a unification through peaceful means, proposing political contacts between the two governments by setting up an "All-Korea Committee" composed of delegates from both governments.

PRIOR to this, delegates of six hundred thousand Koreans residing in Japan gathered at the beginning of 1955 in Tokyo and formed a "Council for Promoting Korean Unification" (later changed its name to Council for Promoting the Unification of the Fatherland). In North Korea, politicians of both North and South Korea

organized a "Council for Promoting Peaceful Unification" in Pyongyang. And in May 1956, the Central Committee of the Korean Unification Democratic Front issued an appeal "calling to all brethrens" for peaceful unification and in the next year, the same Committee adopted a "Declaration for Peaceful Unification".

Frightened by these movements of the people, the Rhee regime enacted the notorious "National Security Law" in February, 1958 and illegalized the Progressive party, arresting all its leaders. The regime put a taboo on "Peaceful Unification", by taking such suppressive measures as punishing even those who just spoke a word about it. This high-handed policy, however, could not shut up the voices of the people. In November, 1958, the Democratic party which was the only opposition left in the Assembly rejected the unification-by-force plan of the government that it had to then supported. Still the Rhee regime went on

Cho Bong Am

its way. Its fascist characteristics reached its heights when it executed Cho Bong-Am, leader of the Progressive party by branding him a spy. Cho had fought a close race with Syngman Rhee for the Presidency posting "Peaceful Unification" at the forefront of his election program. Cho Bong-Am should be called a martyr of the peaceful unification movement, but with this incident, the movements went underground.

Student demonstrators approaching the National Assembly in the April Revolution last year

Movements for Independent Unification

The unification movement entered its final stage in April, 1960, when the Rhee regime collapsed before the student-led popular uprising. Heretofore calls for unification-by-force naturally disappeared and in the July general elections, nearly all, the parties, conservatives or progressives alike, carried "U.N.-supervised All-Korea general elections" as their election slogan. However there were some difference in their nuances. The conservatives like the Democratic Party preferred entrusting the unification problem to the U.N.; whereas the progressives like the Socialist Popular Party put stress on Korean people's independent action. The Democrats emerged as the victors and formed a new government. But in time, the people became disillusioned with U.N.-supervised general elections, and turned their goal towards unification through independent actions of the nation itself.

On August 14th, Kim Il Sung, Premier of North Korea, proposed forming a North-South Federation of Governments as the first stage of unification and positively endorsed economic and cultural interchange between North and South Korea. Then in September, U.S. Senator

Mansfield recommended in his report to the U.S. Senate, the possibility of neutralizing Korea in the pattern of Austria in order to bring about her unification. The Democratic Government simply brushed aside these proposals, but they certainly brought impetus on the people. The students who spearheaded the April Revolution, now held debates and seriously tackled the unification problem. Again they did not limit their activities to classrooms. In November, the students of Seoul University formed a "Seoul University National Unification League" and colleges throughout the country followed suit setting up various unification research circles. They wound up presenting a resolution to the government in which they requested:" The Government should change to positive and realistic diplomacy for the sake of bringing about unification. Prime Minister Chang should visit the United States and Soviet Union for the sole purpose of discussing the Korean unification problem with their leaders. The Government should immediately open free exchange of letters between North and South Korea."

Coincidently popular demonstrations were unfolded in Seoul, Pusan, Taigu and other cities carrying such placards as:

"Unification is the only road to live"

"Open North and South economic and cultural exchange"

"We reject unification relying on foreign powers"

"Government must stop sabotaging unification"

Meanwhile in North Korea, Chairman of the Permanent Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly, Choe Young-kwen, submitted a report to the Assembly on "furthering the promotion of peaceful unification." This report modified the plan proposed by Premier Kim Il Sung in August and with this as a momentum, North Korean youth leaques cultural organizations and athelete associations launched drives calling to the South Koreans to open up mutual exchange.

ON February 25, 1961, the "Council for National Independent Unification" was formed in South Korea. This body brought together such forces as reformist parties, Christian and Buddhist societies, student and youth leagues and labor organizations. The Council declared to "oust all forces which perplex the people and obstruct unification by sabotage or by making calls for 'reconstruction first, then unification' " and proposed as the first stage of unification: 1) North and South economic exchange 2) Exchange of news reporters and inspection teams 3) Exchange of letters 4) To send North-South combined team to international athletic meets. Furthermore, the Council sent messages to the U.N. Secretary General, Heads of the U.S. and Soviet Governments, Premier Chang and also to Koreans living abroad, requesting support for peaceful and independent unification of Korea based on the principle of self-determination. This body, which has gathered vast support among the South Koreans is now the main force pushing the "independent and peaceful unification" movement.

Fearing such heightening of the people's will for unification both in the North and South for unification both in the North issued warnings that such movements would only bring in communism to South Korea. Premier Chang declared that the Government was definitely against North-South Federation or neutralization of Korea; that he would maintain the present illegalization of the Communist Party after unification and deny communists entering the elections; and also that he was considering measures to discipline demostrations for unification. And President Yun made clear that the Government's policy was "reconstruction first, then unification". Thus the Chang Government drifted away on a course quite contrary to the will of the public.

The Chang Government has not accomplished any of the democratic reforms which were demanded after the collapse of the Rhee regime. It not only sabotaged the punishment of those political criminals

and illicit fortune-makers under the Rhee regime but have also failed in its economic and foreign policies. On this account, the livelihood of the nation has fallen into unprecedented difficulties. Discontent among the public is accumulating. Demonstration demanding food and jobs are joining hands with the unification movement and closing in on the Government.

To block these demands of the people, the Chang Government schemed enaction of such legislation as the "Provisional Special Law for Anti-communism" and "Demonstration Control Law". Such conservatives like the New Democratic Party even opposed these laws, condemning them as defying the human rights guaranteed by the ROK Constitution and suppressive measures to obstruct the unification movement. And demonstrations were carried out throughout the country in protest against these law bills. Starting with Taigu on March 18th, townspeople, students and laborers staged continuous demonstrations in Seoul, Pusan, Tuen Tu, Kwang Tu, Woen Tu and other cities and shook the Chang Government. Meeting such violent public retaliation, the Government withdrew these law bills and changed its tactics to replace them by revising the present National Security Law. But the public was not to be deceived. The Anti-

The People's Demonstration Against Chang Myun's Cabinet which suppresses the Unification Movement.

Special Law fight has advanced into Down-with-the-Government and Unification Acceleration struggles. And they are still going on today in various areas of the country, and reached new heights when the First Anniversary of the Revolution was observed on April 19th. It must be said that the situation in Korea is again nearing a crisis.

LASTLY, we must refer to the unification movements staged here in Japan where 600,000 Koreans reside. As stated above, Korean residents delegates from both the left and right gathered in Tokyo as early as 1955 and formed the "Council for Promoting Unification of the Fatherland". However, this movement was later undermined by the Rhee regime and subversive actions by irresponsible elements. And the two opposing organizations of Koreans in Japan—the Republic of Korea Residents Union (mindan) and General Federation of Korean Residents in Japan (Chosen Soren)—carried on their long antagonism.

After collapse of the Rhee regime, however, they have shaken off such controversies and are advancing towards cooperation for peaceful unification of the fatherland. Business men, physicians, journalists and artists have held series of meetings, discussing the unification problem which means that they are leading the homeland in North-South exchanges. And jointly, these people have sent messages to the Korean governments requesting unification and North-South economic and cultural exchange.

Finally, Kim Yong Tu, Head of the Korean Problem Research Institute in washington, has been actively making appeals to international circles by proposing concrete plans for Korean unification.

Thus we have seen the rough outline of the Korean people's 15 years of struggle for unification. We believe that our movement have come to its final stage. To unify Korea peacefully is the only road to save our nation. It also is the only way we can contribute to the peace the Far East and the world as well. The Korean nation will continue its fight under the flag of "Independent and Peaceful Unification", until the day we attain our goal. (By Kang Hyonchol)

Proposing an All-out National Movement for Unification

By SU MIN-HO (*Vice Speaker of R.O.K. House of Representatives*)

THE time for our sincerest yearning—unification of our fatherland—to be realized seems ripening each day. This is not merly because Mr. Khrushchev has given his sanction to the North and South Korea Federation plan put forth by North Korean Premier, Kim Il Sung, or becanse U.S. Senator, Mr. Mansfield has suggested the necessity to consider the Korean Unification Problem on the basis of the neutralization formula applied in the case of Austrian Peace Treaty.

In view of the violent changes the world is undergoing, the United States and the Soviet Union might make abrupt alterations in their Far Eastein policies.

Especially, the political maneuverings these two powers are carrying out around Communist China might take a sharp turn. And conse quently, one can say that Korea might be unified at an unexpected time and through an unexpected formula.

Although the Question of Communist Chinese Representation to the United Nations was shelved again, such major questions like disarmament and nuclear test ban agreement can no longer be fully resolved without the participation of Communist China. Thus Communist Chinese representation is bound to be put on the United Nations General Assembly agenda, most likely next September, and an eventual admission of Communist China seems inevitable.

As long as Communist China is not admitted to the United Nations, the Soviet Union will not tackle the Korean Unification Problem with any sincerity. And without Soviet agreement, .no peaceful unification of Korea can be expected. Such harsh facts of reality give us a shudder when we think of the surroundings a unified Korea might be placed in.

Externally, we will be confronted by the Communist Big Two, U.S.S.R. and Peoples' Republic of China. Internally, we Sonth Koreans, who are not only disorganized and completely inexperienced in ideological training but also totally in want of national vigor due to perpetual distrust, unrest and misgivings, must face a showdown with the North Korean Communists who are on the contrary organized and ideologically trained through coercion and brain washing. And althongh we form the majority of the Korean people, the consequence is quite obvious. Under the present circumstances, we don't have a chance of winning.

SO however far the road may be, let us now get down to launch an extensive National Movement in order to prepare us for this grand day of our unification. The Republic of Korean Government has set up a Unification Problem Research Institute, but that's too lukewarm a measure. We should form something far bigger in scale, like for instance a Unification Preparation Committee and by mobilizing townspeople, farmers, laborers and students, regardless of sex and age, we must extend this organization throughout the country. Everybody, politicians of the party in power or not, religious people regardless of their creeds, teachers, patriotic societies and civil organizations should join in the march and push forward this Movement like a prairie fire with the politicians calling from the Assenbly rostrum, teachers lecturing in their classrooms, officers leading at their barracks, labor leaders demonstrating in their plants and journalislists pounding at their typewriters to prepare ourselves for that big day.

However, we must do a bit of thinking before plunging into this Movement. Such simple guiding principles like repeated calls of anti-communist slogans or mere rehearsals of the term democracy so misused and illused in the past will no longer appeal to the people.

But we can look for a guiding principle in calling for a revitalization of the national vigor or an uplifting of patriotism based on truly democratic principles. It can also be sought in the "model citizen" movement suggested by the Rockefeller Fund Report. This model citizen of a true democracy, is one who possesses the courage to make objections to the decisions arranged by the leaders, the sense of responsibility to carry out the decisions once decided, the pride not to be suppressed by dictators, the modesty to admit his own limits, and the kindness of heart to love, understand, serve and sacrifice oneself for his brethrens. Such spirit and sentiment is the true secret that enables democracy to flourish. And once, each and every one of us is armed with this spiritual armor, we will be able to defend ourselves forever, come what danger or outrage.

The enlightenment, recognition and boosting of these guiding principles are the objectives of the National Movement I propose here. And we must fortify ourselves with the spirit of democracy so that we will not be bewildered when confronted by dangerous ideologies loaded with cloak-and-dagger intrigues.

The theoretical leaders of this Unification Preparation Committee must first elaborate these guiding principles. Next they should put in an all-out effort to study and hammer out a scientific and reasonable unification formula that both the North and South Korean people can agree on, by taking into account the violent currents of history and all the national, historic and geographical conditions. And at the same time, they should point out to the people which principle is dangerous and which plan is unreasonable. Only when this is done can we turn the tide and take the initiative in the unification movement!

IN the past, We have seen simular movements become isolated and slip away from the people. That was because they lacked realistic leadership that the people could keep up with. Therefore, instead of posting lofty ideals, we should set up such leaderships that the people can follow. For that matter, all political parties, whether in power or opposition, conservative or progressive, must throw away all the present political warfare among themselves and unite in quest of the just cause; the Government must take immediate measures to improve the living standards of the people as well as clearly setting the difference between good and evil so that it can secure the trust of the people; and the leaders must also win public confidence by displaying patriotism through both speech and deed.

Such action must also be unfolded abroad. We must climb out of our present position as an international orphan, and actively inform our friendly nations as well as those newly born neutral nations, of our demands and determinations in order to gain their sympathy and assistance.

Many of our fellow countrymen cannot sense the storm coming, being deafened by their own complaints about daily hardships and many of our officials still tend to make fuss over the "communist scare." I cannot help but shouting at them to arise in unison with a newly born heart. For we cannot by any means, just look on and wait till unification is thrown into our laps or just stand there and give ourselves up to the mercy of the enemy.

FIRST STEP TO UNIFICATION: NORTH-SOUTH NEGOTIATIONS

The Subjectivity and Objectivity of Peaceful Unification

By Yu Byung-Mook

(Spokesman for Socialist Party and Professor of Foreign Language University)

WE must, by all means, realize unification of North and South Korea during this year. Without unification we can no longer carry on our existence. Such is the sentiment held by each and every one of us today. The nation has been split into two countries for 15 years. Unification is no longer a problem to be left to arguments. It is a problem

stuck fast to painful and urgent necessity arising from our daily experiences that tell us we can no longer live divided. This is the great challenge we face now. The legitimacy of our demands is not our big concern any more. What we must think out is how to realize this great wish of ours, that is, we must find the means of implementation. And for that matter, we must first establish our basic principles of implementation.

The "April Revolution" which brought down the Syngman Rhee Regime last year, clearly wiped out the murderous plan to unify Korea by "marching north" with force advocated by Syngman Rhee up to that time. In its place, plans calling for peaceful unification have come into fashion. Of course, nobody can completely refute the face value of these plans, but if we are to go on endorsing them from ambiguous humanitarian or pacifist standpoints like opposition to killing among ourselves or call for instinctive love towards our brethrens, we will not only be able to discover the scientific basis for our peaceful unification, but we will give chances to those evil forces who are seeking to use these plans as a camouflage to justify the perpetuation of the 38 parallel, which is an anti-national crime worse than the unification-by-force plan. Plans that demand elections should only be held in North Korea according to the South Korean Constitution or call for illegalizing Communism as a pretext to unification are the peaceful unification formulas in this line. Anybody can clearly see that these plans are more sinful than the unification-by-force plan and that they, in truth, are anti-unification wearing the mask of peaceful unification.

The unification plans advocating United Nations assistance or United Nations-supervised elections seem reasonable at a glance, but they have not considered how the United Nations despites its prestige and universality, could actually implement the unification. The United Nations' resolutions have always pointed out the specific conditions deriving from the North and South division of our nation. And as long as US versus Soviet rivalry remains in this world organization, the resolutions would remain the same. This means that unification will be impossible through the UN. So those who insist on unification through the United Nations are, in fact, against unification in a most wryly manner. Well then, what are the scientific subjectivity and historical objectivity on which we must set up our peaceful unification plan?

The tragedy of the Korean War has taught the Korean Nation a big lesson and given us the opportunity to repent. The War has taught us, first of all, that weapons will not decide anything for us however irreconciliable communists and capitalists may be; that we must compete peacefully by recognizing each other's existence; and that the only road is to leave the final decision up to the people's judgment. And subjectively, the harsh and pitiful reality brought on the nation has made peaceful unification a must. And since unification does not only concern the Korean people but is directly and indirectly connected with the rivalry between the Communist and Free camps, the problem has a lot to do with the direction of world history.

THE economic growth of the Communist bloc and relative decline of the capitalist nations have inevitably brought forth liberation of small and weak nations and gradual deterioration of colonial systems. These historic changes since the end of the last world war have coined out the dominance of one bloc over the other. The development of nuclear energy has finally produced the ultimate weapon, making general wars impossible and man-made satellites has opened up the space age. Mankind must put an end to its history of war and aggression and hereafter take the only road left to decide the final victor by competing through democratic and peaceful co-existence. No matter what the subjective intentions of the nations may be, imperialism und aggressive war will always be a retrogressive action against the common front of the small and weak nations as well as the currents of history.

Those people who will run against and defy this historic current shall tumble down to an international orphan and be eventually washed away.

Therefore our peaceful unification must be a conscious national and historic effort towards peaceful co-existence as well as attainance of a national consciousness in the coming space age. Plainly speaking, the principles of peaceful unification can be summed up into

three principles: independent, democratic and peaceful unification.

Unification plan based on these principles will not force things on others; it is to persuade others into cooperating with us to work out a plan that will not only satisfy the whole Korean people but also arrest the cooperation of foreign powers.

IF on the contrary, we were to discuss unification with a third party or entrust resolution of the problem entirely to third parties, besides resulting in disregards of our independence, no solution will ever come forth. Therefore peaceful unification must start from North and South negotiations. The negotiations should put off such ideas like anti-communist democratic unification or permanent neutralization of Korea until the elections are over since they deal with the political character of the coming unified nation. Instead, the negotiations must be centered on discussion of technical and practical points of the general election for unification and when agreement is reached, the people must give an all-out effort to arrest the support of the United Nations as wells as world opinion for this decision.

In this way alone can we coordinate self-determination with international cooperation. Thus if we are to go independently, we will have to advance step by step. To meet this requirement, we shonld establish a Unification Problem Research Body and at the same time hold more North-South negotiations. In this sense exchange of inspection teams, trade, culture and letters between North and South Korea should be opened at once.

Finally, there are persons who confuse principles with plans and say absolutely no to unification. They are afraid of the country that will emerge after the unification and some even put up geopolitic reasons for opposing. I want to tell these people that they are taken with defeatism and inferiority complex which disables them to understand unification as a historic demand in this new age of peaceful co-existence and at the same time that this is a conscious national movement.

Why is it Necessary to Unify North and South Korea?

Observation of the Unification Problem from an Economic Viewpoint.

THE world should note the hopes, fears, plights and plans of the South Korean people who are placed in miserable situations. It is not foreign aids that we truly wish for, let alone foreign-made weapons. The Korean people in their 4,000 years of history have never begged others for help to carve out their own future. What we are craving for is to be given our legitimate rights to reunify our divided nation independently and peacefully.

Independent and peaceful unification is not only a rightful political demand of the Korean people who have maintained 4,000 years of national unity, but also an economic necessity for securing its self-sustainance. As long as the nation remains divided, all efforts for national self-sustainance and prosperity shall end in vain. So we must say that unification is more an

urgent problem economically than politically.

Farmers on the Brinks of Starvation

In going into our observation, we should see how the division of the nation and presence of foreign powers in Korea have affected her economy. Let us first of all take a look at the agricultural districts. Korea has always been an agricultural country. She remained so under the rule of the Japanese Imperialists too being deprived of her rights to industrialization The Japanese forced their highpriced products on Korea and took away raw materials and primary goods cheaply. During the last World War, they even snatched grains from the Korean farmers in the name of quota delivery. They also obstructed national capital from investing in manufacturing industries by setting up legal walls. In short, the Japanese Imperialists' policy was to keep Korea nailed down as an agricultural nation so they can maintain their rule more easily. So Korea was exploited and suffered as a colonial agricultural nation.

Against our great expectations, liberation from Japanese rule did not bring paradise upon us. On the contrary, economic situation seems aggravating the more. For after 15 years since liberation, South Korea which had been heretofore called the granary of Korea, has deteriorated in her productive power, and now there are thousands of farmers on the verge of starvation. Presently, an incredible 42% of the total farmers, that is some 6 million farm households are left in a famishing state near the brinks of starvation. And what is more unbelievable is the fact that the Government, in defiance of this desperate state of its own farmers, is so frantic about selling 100 thousand tons of rice to Japan and doing such big talks as sending free "relief rice" to North Korea.

A correspondent of the conservative daily, Hankuk Ilbo, has given us a vivid on-the-spot report (dated March 14, 1961) of this plightful situation: "Kim Tae-Suen died of starvation on February 1. This 58 year old peasant who lived in Samchuen-ri Shinan-mjun Buan-country, Julla-province, had been famishing for several months. When the new year came, he had to lay his skeleton-like body in bed. And in a month's time, without being given a single dose of medicine during his entire illness, Kim silently passed away. And so his poor soul was liberated from the agonies of hunger. However, the situation is quite dreadful since hunger does not concern the old man Kim alone. All his neighbors are on the same verge of starvation: 1,280 households, 8,295 persons (95%) of this Samchuen-ri village is famishing". The situation is quite incredible.

Heavily in Debt

Another index will show us the plightful state of the farmers: The total liabilities of Korean farmers added up to the enormous amount of 184.4 billion hwan, which is 80 thousand hwan debt per household, at the end of 1959. The situation is truly grave because 70% of the liabilities is debts with high interests and 85% of these high interest debts were borrowed for living expenses.

This 80 thousand hwan debt per household is equal to ⅓ of the nation-wide average per farm household proceeds of 298,037 hwan in 1959 (*Economic Statistics Yearbook* 1960). The farmers, hard pressed by expenses, must mortgage their rice paddies in order to buy food. Some even go so far as borrowing at such astonishing rate as 100% interest. So when the harvest time comes, farmers wouldn't even have a cup of rice left in his own hands. In Dec., 1960, only a month after harvest, 220,000 farm households in Chung-chong-bug-do (province) already had no rice on hand!

High rate money lenders or usurers are typical in Korea. And the ruthless way they prey on poverished Korean farmers is incomparable. Small capital cannot find its way into industrial investment in Korea whose markets are flooded with foreign

goods. So small capital has to take the form of high interest money lenders and exploit the poor farmers.

Real Causes of Impoverishment

Famine and usurers are the main elements that symbolize the impoverished state of Korean agricultural districts. But what are the real causes that brought along such impoverishment? One cause is the colonial structure of Korean economy. Another is the fact that Korea is being used as foreign military bases and her markets are dominated by foreign products But the fundamental cause lies in the various contradictions arising from the division of our fatherland. The farmers, restricted by the policy of the government backed by foreign powers, cannot unite or, I should say, lack or are politically deprived of basic living conditions to unite among themselves. Thus all the burdens springing from the contradictions are shifted to the farmers.

Tax Burden

Heavy taxes are hitting hard on the farmers. Beginning with income taxes and Land-Repayment-Taxes, various taxes imposed on farmers run up to some thirty kinds. The average yearly tax burden of a petty farmer possessing less than 1.25 acres of arable land, amounted to 8,611 hwan in 1959. In the same year, these farmers earned proceeds of 359,895 hwan per household, but since their total expenses added up to 368,772 hwan, a dificit of 8,877 hwan resulted (*Economic Stastistics Yearbook* 1960). Thus in order to pay taxes, the farmers must again borrow money.

Farms under 1.25 acres occupy 42% of the entire farm population. If we convert their yearly income into dollars, it would be 275 dollars per household, 42 dollars per capita. This is 3 dollars and a half a month! Compare this to 2 dollars and 13 cents that a factory hand in the United States would get in 1 hour's work. In Japan, such petty farmers would receive relief aid; whereas in Korea, the Government goes on taking 8,611 hwan of taxes each year.

No Tax Recompensation

What are the recompensations that farmers receive in returns for such heavy taxes? Practically nothing. Lack of measures for the agricultural districts, on the contrary, have brought grave results. Irrigation facilities have virtually collapsed. Only 19.3% of the total paddy field area can utilize irrigation now. So a little drought would easily spoil the crops. And on the other hand, the mountains are cut bare so a little rain would flood the rivers and wash away the rice fields. Floods and droughts take turns by the year in impairing the crops. Thus lack of water works and anti-flood projects has left the land to rapid destruction.

Low Rice Price Policy

Another pillory that is strangling the necks of the farmers is the Government's low rice price policy. This policy is supported by the "free quota delivery system" through which the farmers repay with grain produce for the land they've been alloted by the Government and also by the imports of U.S. surplus agricultural products.

The grain produce which the Government receives from the farmers through the free quota delivery system is collected as "Farm Land Repayment Tax". And in the name of this tax and other pretexts, the Government collected up to ⅓ of the total rice produce and ⅙ of the total wheat produce during the Korean War. And in 1959, the Government was still collecting 8.5% and 5.4% respectively of the total rice and wheat produce. (See Table 1) In this manner the Government has fortified its low rice price policy.

Through this quota delivery system and imports of U.S. surplus farm products, the Government has built up a tremendous grain stock. And by this stock, the Govern-

TABLE 1
Government Collections of Rice and Summer Grains

Grain Year	Collection (A)	Crop (B)	(A/B)×100%
Rice, Cleaned			
1949	3,256	14,734	23.8
1950	5,200	14,607	35.6
1951	2,986	11,349	26.3
1952	1,938	9,284	20.9
1953	2,737	14,136	19.4
1954	3,802	15,003	25.3
1955	2,242	15,515	14.4
1956	3,039	12,781	23.8
1957	1,638	15,738	10.4
1958	1,425	16,595	8.6
1959	1,426	16,602	8.6
Summer Grains, Cleaned			
1949	786	5,055	13.8
1950	176	5,223	4.7
1951	358	3,034	11.5
1952	582	4,365	16.4
1953	541	5,152	10.4
1954	838	6,539	8.6
1955	631	5,449	16.7
1956	396	5,805	15,8
1957	351	5,179	7.7
1958	507	6,268	7.3
1959	410	7,231	5.4

Pref. p. 139 Economic Satistic Yearbook.

ment supports its big armed forces of 600,000 men and rations cheap rice to government clerks in order to supplement their low wages. Furthermore, it releases food stocks for market operation purposes to keep down the price level. The rate grains for these purposes occupied against the total Government controlled grain in 1958 was: armed forces use, 31%; rationing to government clerks, 25%; and market operation use, 13% (*Economic Statistic Yearbook* 1959). All this clearly testify that the South Korean Government puts its base on the exploitation of the farmers.

US Surplus Farm Products

The other lever that supports the Government's low rice price policy, U.S. surplus farm goods literally flooded into Korea ever since liberation and the quantity is growing each year. Total Korean grain imports marked only 164,402 metric tons in 1946, but when we come to 1959, the figure jumps up to an astonishing 947,376 metric tons. (See Table 2) This is an increase by sixfolds. The main supporting role of the low rice price policy is being shifted from the quota dilivery system to U.S. surplus farm goods. The main objective of receiving U.S. surplus farm goods assistance is to supplement the vast defense needs. In relation to this point, the conservative daily, Hanguk-ilbo, writes as follows: "The main objective of receiving U.S. surplus farm products aids today, is to supplement the vast defense expenditures, which the Government cannot furnish by itself. And since the Government is bent on maintaining its big scaled defense program, imports of U.S. surplus farm goods is absolutely necessary. In the Fiscal 1961 National Budget Bill that passed the House of Representives on Dec. 8 (1960), defense expenditures occupied 165.6 billion hwan of the over-all total expenditures, 505 billion hwan. 132 billion hwan of the defense expenditures will be provided by sales accounts of aid materials. This shows that bulk of defense expendi-

TABLE 2
Grain Imports[1] units: metric

Year[2]	Quantity tons
1946	164,402
1947	353,957
1948	267,282
1949	56,998
1950	44,088
1951	209,365
1952	445,354
1953	959,341
1954	182,978
1955	96,076
1956	502,197
1957	875,541
1958	987,376

Source: Ministery of Agriculture and Forestry.
1) Figures represent total imports by government agencies, private concerns and foreign aid.
2) Annual figures are for the grain year i.e. 12 months ending 31 October.

ture depend on aid materials. . . . However, from the viewpoint of maintaining grain prices and the grain rationing plan, the Agriculture and Forestry Ministry have no intentions of importing grains beyond needs."

Then, why does the United States prefer surplus farm goods aids? Because they're cheaper. An American has testified to this point. Mr. Dodge, the banker who was sent to Japan in 1950 as head of an economic mission, wrote in his statement to the Congress: "Foodstuffs, cotton etc. are all surplus materials that commercial and financial cooperations must handle. Therefore, Government expenditures will not increase neither now or in the future on account of such aids. It must be fully noted that aid programs will be carried out mainly through these surplus materials." This statement was written in relation to Japanese aid but it could be applied to Korean aid too. Under the pressure of these surplus farm goods aids, the Korean farmers are really languishing, having their rice price lowered below the production cost. The rice price in Korea is just about half of that in Japan. And in Japan, the low rice price policy of its government is receiving sharp criticism.

Cheap Farm Products

In this manner, prices of agricultural products were kept down. The rice price of 1959 rose to 1,300 times that of 1945. However textiles have risen 2,458 times; fuel (mainly electricity, coal and crude oil), 7,000 times; and fertilizers, 10,788 times. (*Economic Statistic Yearbook* 1961) In other words, a farmer has to sell twice and 8 times as much rice to buy the same quantity of textiles and fertilizers respectively now than he had to in 1945.

What exactly did bring along such big differences? Under Japanese rule, the economic structure of Korea had been given a typical colonial feature. The fact that total output of metal and machine industries in 1939 amounted to only 9.1% and 3.6% respectively of the over-all manufacturing industry total should clearly illustrate this point. When liberation came, it was a supreme command that such feature should have been wiped out. But against our great expectations, Korea was divided into two countries, and this feature was strengthened the more. Under the Japanese, North Korea produced 100% of fertilizers; 79% of minerals (97.9% of coal); 90% of metals; and 96.1% of electricity; whereas South Korea produced 70.9% of agricultural products. These figures are more than enough to show us that the two areas are economically unseperable. Since division of Korea was enforced inspite of such conditions, the damage impaired on the Korean national economy was terrific. And South Korea received the heavier blows. (See Table 3)

After liberation, the industries of South Korea deteriorated. In comparison to levels under Japanese rule, the present metal productions have fallen to 45.1%; textiles, 35.1%; marine industry, 50%; gold, 3.5%; silver, 17.7%; and copper, 11.3 %. (See Table 3)

Migration to Cities

Let us return to our observation of Korean farmers. Low rice price, heavy taxes and loss of labor force to the army—these bad factors— are deepening the impoverishment of farm villages. Many of the farmers are selling out. During the period between 1951 to 1958, 193,309 farm households under 2.45 acres have lost their farm lands and moved out of their villages where they have lived for centuries. And with their babies and little household wares on their backs, they flow into cities in search of better livelihood. But there are no jobs to await them.

Farmers seems as though they are not conscious of their poverty. They are so used to it that they lack the power to think of ways to pull themselves out of their lot. Such is their present state but from the standpoint of Korean unification, it is highly necessary to mobilize their cooperation too. The time for this to be realized seems ripening too.

TABLE 3

Comparison of Products between S. & N. Korea

By Industry	Unit	Before Libenation					After Liberation		
		During	S. Korea		N. Korea			S. Korea	
			Quantity	%	Quantity	%		Quantity	%
Agriculture	*	1440-44							
Rice	Suk	Average	13,718,157	70.9	5,656,129	29.1	1948	15,485,716	
Summer Grains.....	〃	〃	9,450,110	85.3	1,623,593	14.7	〃	5,438,768	
Pluses	〃	〃	1,171,953	35.2	2,154,961	64.8	1947	1,002,413	
Other Grains.....	〃	〃	1,240,573	19.5	5,128,990	80.5	〃	721,551	
Fishery	Ton	1940	680,000	30.7	1,533,000	69.3	1947	332,000	
Mining Gold.....	Kg	1936	3,084	21.0	11,594	79.0	1948	108	
Silver	〃	〃	5,281	9.0	53,539	91.0	〃	935	17.7
Copper	Ton	〃	531	14.6	3,105	85.0	〃	63	11.3
Lead	〃	〃	0	0	2,738	100.0	〃	236	—
Zinc Concentrate ...	〃	〃	15	0.3	5,556	99.7	〃	422	2,817.3
Tungsten Concentrate	〃	〃	260	15.2	1,447	84.8	〃	1,399	538.1
Coal.....	〃	〃	48,082	2.1	2,233,911	97.9	〃	867,425	1,804.0
Kaolin.....	〃	〃	6,480	26.2	18,232	73.8	〃	7,723	119.1
Graphite.....	〃	〃	19,148	46.8	21,766	53.2	〃	15,545	80.7
Fluorite	〃	〃	0	0	8,740	100.0	〃	0	—
Iron Ore	〃	〃	2	0	234,398	100.0	〃	0	—
Industrial Metal	Thousund Yen	1940	4,900,493	10.0	44,318,540	90.0	1948	2,209,197	45.1
Machine & Uteneil...	〃	〃	13,855,918	72.0	5,393,797	28.0	〃	3,381,134	24.4
Chemical Products.	〃	〃	30,685,404	16.9	150,777,501	83.1	〃	15,158,270	49.4
Pottery	〃	〃	4,313,880	27.5	11,359,741	72.1	〃	1,426,899	33.1
Fibers.....	〃	〃	61,455,799	84.4	11,365,165	15.6	〃	21,567,558	35.1
Foodstuffs	〃	〃	75,991,638	64.0	42,760,508	36.0	〃	6,586,941	8.7
Printing & Bookbinding	〃	〃	6,225,254	88.0	781,547	11.2	〃	1,620,263	26.0
Others	〃	〃	50,675,438	76.0	15,989,711	24.0	〃	196,877	1.4
Total	〃	〃	248,103,824	46.7	282,746,510	53.0	〃	52,647,139	21.2
Electric Power.....	kW	1940-44 Average	36,500	3.9	909,200	96.1	〃	54,572	149.5

Notes: (1) % before Liberation represent composition ratio between North and South Korea.
(2) % after Liberation represent South Korean production ratio in comparison to production before Liberation.
(3) Electricity out-put after Liberation includes thermal powered electricity.
(4) Products of 1940 are revised in accordance with 1948 price index.
(5) 1 suk=180.39 liters.

Poverty of Townspeople: Unemployment

Let us next look into the livelihood of urban residents. The gravest problem we run into here is unemployment. Of course, unemployment is not a phenomenon specific to urban areas. The problem is critical in the rural area too but unemployment there is rather potential and difficult to grasp.

On inquiring into unemployment problems, authentic statistics are requisite. But in the case of Korea, the figure differ according to the compiling agency. For instance, the figures of the Statistic Dept. of the Home Affairs Ministry and that of the Health and Welfare Ministry are conflicting. Furthermore, the figures vary according to their use. When it's necessary to appease the public the unemployment figure would be announced somewhere around 520,000. And if increase of aid is envisaged, the figure would multiply into "fully unemployed, 1,200,000; potential unemployment, 1,000,000." (conf.: Prime Minister Chang's Memorandum to the U.S. Government on Korean Economic Reform Plan, dated Dec. 2, 1960) In fact, it might be said: "In a view, the whole 20 million people of South Korea is placed in some sort of an unemployed state."

Although the statistics are confused, we can still get a fairly good picture of the unemployment situation by comparing various statistics. It is generally estimated that fully and partly unemployed (including those disabled like physically handicapped persons and seasonal laborers but excluding farm and fishery laborers) would run up to about 4,300,000 persons.

Urban Unemployment over 4 Million

Here is how we reach this figure: In Dec. 1948, the population of South Korea was estimated at 22,000,000. Since it is practically impossible to grasp the unemployed in agriculture and fishing industries, we can strike out the population engaged in those two industries, which will leave us the remaining population of 8,900,000.

The Nathan Report issued a little after the Korean Armistice, placed productive population at 68% of the over-all population. Utilizing this formula, we get a productive population of roughly 6,000,000 (excluding agriculture and fishery). However since 1,200,000 new jobs were created and 210,000 military personnel and 360,000 high school and college students come from urban families, these figures have to be substracted. This leaves us a total of 4,230,000 persons fully and partly unemployed. The above figures were based on 1958 statistics. But the situation has become worse, so this figure can even be considered an underestimate of the present situation. At any rate, an unemployment of over 4 million means that one out of each two persons are on the full or partly unemployed list!

Family Tragedies

Not a single week passes away without seeing Korean newspapers reporting on suicides and whole family suicides due to living hardships. The following is a report on a dual suicide committed by an unemployed barber and his wife leaving four small children. "Mr. and Mrs. Kim Song-Ryoen of Seoul committed suicide yesterday leaving the following note: "Three months have passed without a job. We could no longer stand hearing our boy cry each morning begging us to buy Education Bonds that the school persuade each guardian to buy. We will strangle the newly born baby. Other members of the family will take poisons". (*Seoul Shimmun*, Nov. 11, 1960 issue) Such incidents are countless.

The position of the employed could hardly be secure with so vast a labor reserve force behind and hordes of people migrating from the farm lands. They are also threatened by curtailment and bankrupcy of businesses and, in addition, price inflation is cutting down on their real wages.

Sharp Drop of Real Wages

A year after liberation (1946) real wages had already dropped 67%. That is prices inflated 92 times while wages only rose 32 times. Presently, real wages have dropped further to 67% of the 1946 level. In this way, laborers' wages are falling down to famishing points too. For example, a month's average wage of a cotton-mill hand is 16,000 hwan. When converted into dollars, it would be only 12 dollars and 30 cents!

Even with jobs, one cannot live. The following news article gives us a lively picture. "A Seoul policeman committed suicide yesterday. Kim Yun-tae, who has served nine years in the Seoul police force, killed himself with his own pistol at his home in Tong Kim where he had been living in a rent-free shanty house. He is survived by his wife and four children and also his mother. The motive of the suicide is seen as hard life. Kim lift a note stating: "A policeman has to serve honestly. To live honestly is a thing too hard. I can no longer toler the difficulties of life". Livelihoods of low level government clerks are considered relatively good. So it wouldn't be difficult to imagine the state people working in civilian businesses, particularly in medium and small businesses, are placed in.

We have so far seen low rice price policy and famine hitting the rural people on the one hand and unemployment and low wages threatening the urban people on the other. In other words ,the Korean people are nigh suffocating under the strains of poverty.

Why all this poverty? As we have seen before, the primary causes lie in the three following facts:

1) As a result of 36 years of colonial exploitation by the Japanese imperialists, Korean economy was molded into an economy with a typical colonial structure.
2) Although Liberation provided a unique opportunity to wipe out these colonial features, the tragical division of Korea, on the contrary, deepened the defects.
3) The stationing of foreign armed forces is perpetuating the division.

Colonial Structure of Korean Economy

Let us observe the extent of colonialization under the Japanese rule. In 1944, Korean industrial production amounted to only 37.4% of the gross national product. This figure indicated the low level of industrialization and this trend was extremely emminent in the heavy and chemical industries. (As stated before machine and metal industry production occupied only 3.6 and 9.1% respectively of the total industrial products of 1939.) Thus Korea relied heavily on Japan for her supply of heavy and chemical industry products.

In 1944 Korea supplied only 51% of her machine tools. (*Korean Central Bank Monthly Report*) And on top of this, most of these enterprises did not belong to the Koreans. The Japanese owned 98% of the total corporation capital. Koreans possessed only 2%! (*Korean Central Bank Monthly Report,* Aug., 1947 edition) The Korean backwardness was the same in technology too. Although plant hands were mostly Koreans, technicians were mostly Japanese. Against the total technicians in each industries Korean technicians occupied only 11% (133 persons) in metal industry; 25% in machine industry; 12% (222 persons) in chemical industry; and 27% (132 persons) in textile industry. (*Korean Economy,* published by Toyo Keizai Shimpo-sha of Japan).

Deepening of Colonial Features after V-J Day

When Liberation came, Korean economy was held back in such a distorted structure. This movement asked for immediate action to completely reform such distortions, but the country had to be cut in two by the vivalry between the U.S., and Soviet Union which consequently resulted in strengthening the above tendencies.

Since the division of Korea split this

nation into heavy industry (also minerals) centered North Korea and agriculture-centered South Korea, rapid deterioration of Korean industries ensued. This deterioration was universal. Although little increase in production was seen in three fields, namely, minerals, coal and electricity, production, the efforts still could answer only 1/10 of the demands. In this way, North-South division of the nation brought forth unprecedented shortages in power and raw materials.

Although I have no statistics on hand to see what damages were impaired on North Korea, it couldn't have been small either. The North Koreans, however, set their goals on an self-sustaining economy and are vigorously executing this policy, have overcome the damages. This is illustrated in Table 4 & 5.

TABLE 4

Ratio of Capital Investment in Basic Industries in 1949

	Electricity	Coal	Steel	Minerals	Machinery	Chemical	Light
New construction and expansion	58.5%	79.7%	76.6%	88.1%	88.1%	79.1%	98.8%
Reparation	37.7	15.3	4.2	5.2	5.2	0.1	0.5
Reconstruction	3.8	5.0	19.2	6.7	6.7	20.8	0.7
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Note: Statistic by Korean Institute of Sciences. (*Development of People's Economy*)

TABLE 5

Index of Industrial Growth (1946 100%)

1947	1948	1949	1950 (plan)
189.3%	263.3%	377.1%	511.0%

Note: Statistic by Korean Institute of Sciences. (*Development of People's Economy*)

According to a pamphlet issued by the U.S. State Department dated Sept. 25, 1947, Japanese assets in South Korea counted 92.2% of total arable land. The U.S. Military Government, which seized these Japanese assets, transferred them at excessively cheap prices to Koreans. These sales amounted to 1.45 billion hwan, but most of the accounts were used up on occupation expenditures.

The management of the "Restored Businesses" which were supervised first by the U.S. Military Government and later by the ROK Government, showed extreme stagnation. These businesses occupied 22.6% of total South Korean businesses in 1948. And as to the employees, they hired 51.7% of the total, but when it came to total production, they only put out 35% (1949 *Economic Review* issued by the Korean Central Bank). Since these relatively big businesses did not show high productivity, deterioration of the economy was accelerated.

North-South Division Impairing the Economy

The formations of the Republic of Korea in 1948 and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea that immediately followed, made the division of Korea decisive. And as the conflict between the two intensified, the budget of the South Korean Government became more and more centered on defense expenditures. In fiscal 1949, a year before the outbreak of the Korean War, direct and indirect defense expenditures amounted to 47% of the whole budget. Consequently, vast deficits in the balance were created. Total revenue of the fiscal 1949 budget was 57.3 billion hwan, of which loan accounts amounted to 27.5 billion hwan. Nearly half of the revenue was provided by debts which, of course, brought forth overissuing of bank notes.

Due to low production caused by industrial deterioration and overissuing of bank notes, prices literally zoomed. In the 5 years after Liberation, prices multiplied 35 times. The rise was particularly conspicuous in electricity and chemical products which had hitherto relied solely on

the North. Then on top of all these bad conditions, the Korean War broke out on June 25, 1950. This unwanted war, with the use of newest weapons, brought nearly the entire Korean industrial installations down to ashes.

Total Destruction by Korean War

I will give here a simple outline of the damages done by the War on Korean economy. The above mentioned book *"Korean Economy"* summarizes the damages as follows: "Estimates show that in the agricultural field, 10.5 billion hwan worth of farm installations and equipments, and 500 million hwan worth of irrigation facilities were destroyed, while man power and livestocks were reduced by 60%. In the industrial field, 90% of the plants in Seoul and Inchon areas were destructed, and 11.4 billion hwan worth of plant installations, 8.8 billion hwan worth of machinery and equipments were lost. The textile industry which is the largest manufacturing industry in South Korea, suffered such big damages as 54% of its factory buildings, 67% of its spindles, and 47% of its machines lost. And due to shortages in coal, electricity, raw materials and man power, the entire manufacturing industry except a small portion of the handicraft industry, stopped production entirely. In the other fields, destruction of public installations and civilian properties was particularly bad. (See Table 6)

TABLE 6

Plant Damages during Korean War

Industries	Buildings			Machinery & Installations		Total Damages	
	tsubo (=3.3 sq:m)	cost (hwan)	% of damages	cost (hwan)	% of damages		
Mineral	8,090	1,213,500	19%	115,500	15%	1,329,000	18%
Nonferrous	6,200	930,000	39	17,000	17	947,000	88
Chemical Industry	34,229	5,818,930	16	9,666,200	12	15,485,130	13
Textile	116,608	41,689,395	56	46,199,500	61	87,888,895	58
Pottery	7,640	1,298,800	15	195,285	10	1,494,085	15
Food	6,500	1,105,000	20	347,200	20	1,452,200	20
Printing	4,854	825,180	65	1,396,770	65	2,221,950	65
Machinery	2,464	369,700	46	96,435	23	466,135	38

Statistic eompiled by Bank of Korea (1955 *Year Book*)

TABLE 7

War Expenditures and Budget Deficits during Korean War

Year	Total Expenditures	War Expenditures	Total Revenue	Deficit
1951	1,546	924 (60)%	1,117	429 (29)%
1952	9,980	5,058 (50)	5,547	4,433 (45)
1953	73,000	58,000 (79)	31,000	42,000 (60)

Notes: (1) Ref: 1955 *Korean Economic Year Book.*
(2) Figures for 1953 represent old hwan.

TABLE 8

Bank Notes Issued by Bank of Korea and U.N. Loans

(unit: 100 million hwan)

Year	Total issue	Index	Loans to U.N.	Loan rate to Bank notes
1950. 6. 25	558	30%	——	——%
1950 12	2,292	123	609	37.6
1951 12	5,579	299	4,265	76.4
1952 12	10,144	545	9,782	96.4
1953 6	12,960	699	12,429	96.1

Notes: (1) Ref: Bank of Korea *Monthly Statistics.*
(2) Figures for June 1953 are convented into old hawn.
(3) Index: 1954.8.15=100

During the Korean War, war expenditures (direct) occupied 50 to 80% of the total budget, and deficits in the balance marked 29 to 60% over the revenue. (See Table 7) In addition to this, loans to the United Nations Forces amounted to 2,703.5 billion hwan during the War which equalled 95.4% of the total bank notes. (See Table 8). The bulging of the deficit budgets and loans to U.N. Forces, over-issuing of bank notes plus the devastation of productive installations pushed prices up and up. In the meantime, devastation in North Korea was even worse. Total damages ran up to 420 billion hwan. In 1953, the total industrial output of state and cooperative enterprises couldn't reach 60% of the pre-Korean War level despite desperate efforts on the people's part. It was said that bombs equalling the number of the whole North Korean population was dropped on that area. This gives us a lively idea of the state of destruction impaired in that sector. The Korean War put a big setback on North Korea's economic development.

Eight years have passed since the gun-smokes of the Korean War have receded from the Korean skies, yet South Korea remains a country of famine, unemployment and soldiers. In the fiscal 1961 budget, defense expenditures still occupy some 40% of the total expenditure. As New Democratic Party Representative, Hong Chun-Shik has stated, South Korea has the lowest national income per capita in the world. Inspite of that, this poor Korea has armed forces of 600,000 men strong, which is 4th largest in the world! The present Prime Minister, Mr. Chang, who succeeded Hok Joeng, head of the caretaker Government set up after the "April Revolution" in 1960, committed in his inauguration speech that he would reduce 500,000 men from the present army, but even this promise, like many others, was thrown to the winds.

Only Solution: Unification

Not a single fundamental problem dealing with economic reform has been resolved. To be sure, none is solvable as long as Korea remains divided anyway. For, above everything, underground resources are maldistributed and nearly all of them lie in the North. In 1936, the North produced 80% of gold; 85% of copper; 91% of silver; 85% of lead; 99.7% of zinc ore; 84.8% of tungsten; and 90% of metals. Moreover, 97.1% of electricity power was produced in the North. These figures testify the impossibility of South Korea attaining self-sustainance all by herself.

Nevertheless, we have our own Don Quixotes who insist on building self-sustaining economy for South Korea. Syngman Rhee was one. Another is the present premier, Mr. Chang. Their hidden aim is to get more aid from foreign countries. But what help has the 3 billion dollars of U.S. aid actually done in getting Korean economy on its own two feet?

Are U.S. Aids Plus to Korean Economy?

To our great regrets, the American aids

are not helping the Korean economy as we would wish it. Since they were aimed at supporting the defense-centered Government finance, the bulk of the aids have been composed of consumer goods. When aids take this form, they tend to put heavy pressure on the light industries where most of the national capital is invested. Thus these industries are really feeling the pinch. In other words, we can say that as long as the American aids are executed along the same line, they will continue to do more harm than good to the Korean economy.

The South Korean people have come to realize that the only road to live is via immediate unification of North and South Korea. You can hear such voices throughout the country, at farmers' give-us-food demonstrations, at sit-down strikes by the unemployed, and at mass rallies held against the Government.

And how is the Government reacting towards these rightful demands of the people The Government thinks that it's surrounded by inflammables. The people are only asking for food and jobs, but the Government condemns them as Communists. It even go so far as using clubs and rifles against these poor people, being unaware that guns would ignite the inflammables as they did a year ago!

I think it is plain now that peaceful unification of North and South Korea is a problem of life or death to the Korean nation. Whether we will be allowed to develop into a truly self-reliant and democratic nation depends solely on unification.

Advantages of Unification

Lastly, let us see what advantages will be given us when we become unified.

TABLE 9

North-South Production Comparison of Major Manufactured Products

Products	Unit	North Korea (1958)	South Korea (1959)
Electricity	1 billion kwh	7.6	1.69
Coal	1 million t	6.8	2.06
Pig-iron	1000 t	320	8.3
Steel	1000 t	365	38.2
Steel plates	1000 t	255	4.76
Electric motors	1000 sets	17	3.81
Transformers	1000 sets	8	4.40
Metal cutting tools	1000 sets	1.45	0
Chemical fertilizers	1000 t	475	0
Potash soda	1000 t	9.3[1]	0
Carbite	1000 t	150	0
Cement	1000 t	1,244	357.86
Bricks	1 million pieces	736[2]	18000 t
Plate glass	1000 m^2	2,568	[3] 3,268 cases[4]
Hardwood	1 million m^3	3.15	0.27
Lumber	〃	1.24	0.15
Cotton textiles	1 million m	110	150
Silk textiles	1 million m		16
Shoes	1 million pairs	21	45.16
Fichery	1000 t	682	382.125
(Population)		about 1000	about 2,300

Notes: On North Korea: refer to *Economic Handbook* published by Kinokuniya Shoten, Japan.
On South Korea: refer to Bank of Korea *Monthly Statistics*, 1960.
1) & 2) Figure represents 1957
3) & 4) Used cases and 1000 t according to Bank of Korea *Monthly Statistics*.

Look at Table 9, mining and industry products are overwhelmingly dominant in North Korea, while light industry products are dominant in South Korea. For instance electricity is produced five times as much in North Korea than in South: coal, three times; pig-irons, thirty-seven times. Meanwhile, South Korea produces twice more textitles and shoes than the North

Indeed, when North and South Korea is united Korean Peninsula would gain its organic unity. Next, there will be no more need for maintaining armies of 600,000 men each. This will naturally bring an end to heavy taxes and surplus farm goods imports. Then inflation will no longer prevail. Such would enable the Korean people to part with low wages, poverty and all other miseries. The South Korean farmers will get North Korean fertilizers to raise their crops. The North Koreans will eat rice produced in South Korea. Electricity will be supplied from the North to run the spinning mills of the South, and North Koreans will wear Made in S. Korea clothes. Such reactivation of the industries will wipe out unemployment, starvation and suicides. If production means and man power will be realloted in line with the distributions of underground resources, wealth would rapidly spring from the land.

These are the real things that Koreans are asking and struggling for. So we would like to have the world understand our position and extend its guarantee to us, and assure us of our rights to independent and peaceful unification. We will also call on those nations that are in the same or similar situation as we are to push forward our common struggle together And to those people who truly sympathize with us, we pledge anew our determination to realize unification whatever the odds may be and thus work for the cause of eternal peace on this earth. (by Yu, Suek.)

EDITORIALS OF NEWSPAPERS IN KOREA

GOVERNMENT MUST CLARIFY ITS VIEWS AND PLANS FOR UNIFICATION

HANGUK ILBO

(*Independent*) May 5, 1961

Foreign Minister Chyung Yil-hying is about the only person who really thinks that the result of the recent U.N. Korean debate was a "big victory" or "highly satisfying" to South Korea. The other delegates who accompanied Chyung to the U.N., were, in fact, shocked by the consequences and a few have dared to reveal the truth.

In the meantime, a lot of new arguments have sprung forth recently requesting a thorough review of the unification problem. The Democratic Party PR Director Shin Sang-cho suggested revising the present U.S.-inclined diplomacy. The New Democratic PartyHouse Whip Yang Il-tong proposed forming a United Council of North and South Korean Civil Organizations.

And in contrast to these plans put forth by conservative politicians, the students led by the Seoul University National Unification League, have called for a North-South student conference, which was, according to foreign news services, immediately welcomed by the North Korean students. Since unification of Korea is a matter of life and death to the nation, it is quite natural that such active and varying ideas should be put forth. But it must be said that such trends, all the more, necessitate the Government to clarify its own unification plan at once so that the people can easily understand what it's all about.

As the 15th Session of the U.N. General Assembly closed its debates without giving Foreign Minister Chyung a chance to speak, we were only given his draft speech. On carefully reading this speech, it sounded more like a lecture on 15 years' history of Korean anti-Communist struggle, and there is no clue whatsoever leading us to the real unification plan of the Government. Nevertheless, we know that the Government plan is generally build up around the idea of U.N.-supervised general elections. But as to its details, we are totally uninformed. And in regards to the plans for U.N.-supervised general elections, it must be noted that they vary much according to their contents.

In short, they can be classified into the following: 1) To hold All-Korea U.N.-supervised general elections enforced according to the procedures provided in the ROK Constitution. 2) To hold U.N.-supervised general elections in North Korea and general elections in South Korea in accordance with the ROK Constitution. 3) To hold U.N.-supervised general elections only in the North Korean area. 4) To hold U.N.-supervised general elections in both Koreas in order to form a New National Assembly. 5) To hold fair and free general elections under the supervision of the U.N.

No. 1 is the formula adopted unanimously by the House on Nov. 3, last year. No. 2 is the plan known as Geneva 14 Point Proposal. No. 3 was endorsed by the Liberal Party up to the April Uprisings, last year. No. 4 is the controversial plan proposed by the late Dr. Cho Byong-ok but altered into the No. 2 plan later by the Democratic Party. And No. 5 was the formula carried in the Joint Declaration issued by South Korea and the 15 U.N. Members that sent troops to Korea. Although the presence of the United Nations is common to all of these formulas, their differences are vast. Then exactly which plan does the Government envisage? If the Government is to answer to the ever-mounting aspiration for unification among the people and is determined to avoid the tragedy of a pro-communist unification, it must reveal clearly to the people a reliable and practicable unification plan if it has any.

It seems as though the Government is turning to positive diplomacy, since it has announced strengthening of the ROK delegation to the U.N. and called for centering its work on the Afro-Asian countries. But what could it do without possessing a unification plan of its own? And how in the world is it going to convince the Afro-Asians? The Government cannot even convince its own people. And how should the Korean delegation explain what itself doesn't know?

The idea to resolve international problems within the framework of the United Nations was the constant policy pursued by the Rhee regime. (Since Nov. 17, 1954 when the U.S.-Korean Protocol was signed) This policy was confirmed many times by the present Democratic Government and also reconfirmed by the Chyung-Rusk Joint Statement issued on last April 25.

However due to the fact that the Western powers are no longer sure of numerical superiority in the U.N., we are informed that there has been a rumor going about that the U.S. officials are contemplating of holding another Geneva Conference on the Korean Question. It might be argued that the unification plan is the important thing and we shouldn't mind so much about the place and form of the dis-

cussions, but since matters concerning international politics would change immensely according to the way in which they are dealt with, we think that the problem should not be handled lightly and should be offered for public criticism at once.

The much anticipated Unification Research Institute is likely to open shop as scheduled. But if the Government is breeding such thoughts as to put aside everything until this Institute makes an extensive study on the unification problem, it will be unpardonable.

The Institute belongs to the Government. It is not an academic institute. And if the Government does not possess a firm conviction no unification, the Institute cannot commence its activities. But such prolonging shall not be permitted as an excuse for the Government from clarifying its unification plans to the people.

U.S. PROPOSAL AFFIRMATIVE TO KOREAN UNIFICATION

MINJOK ILBO

(*Progressive*) April 14, 1961

U.S. Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson tossed a bombshell into the U.N. Political Committee on April 11, by proposing that Communist North Korea be invited to take part in the debate on Korea if it accepted the competence and authority of the United Nations to deal with the Korean Quesion. This proposal was adopted by the Committee on the following day to the great surprise not only for South Korea and the Free Powers but the whole world as well.

It can only be thought that the United States had acted subtlely in view of the fact that it, sooner or later, had to face this situation since the neutral bloc, especially strengthened by the new memberships of the African countries, is gaining weight in the world organization. And we Koreans, as the party concerned, must emphasize the significance of this U.S. move.

What we must stress, first of all, is that both the South Korean Government and the Free Powers which have always ignored the North Koreans in dealing with the Korean unification problem by branding them war criminals and rebels, can no longer carry on such an attitude. The heretofore disregarding of the North Koreans stemmed from the desire to justify one's own position. All the present North-South conflicts have their sources in this attitude of self-justification. And, we may say that each and every nation is working for the justification of its own cause. On this account, the problems which should have been resolved long ago, lie agrounded without even their first steps of resolution being determined as yet. But after all we have really got something here. The U.S. proposal is truly a big step forward.

Of course, we must wait and see whether the North Koreans will accept the conditions the U.S. has attached to its proposal or not. Nethertheless the significance of the U.S. move remains the same. It implies that the legality of the South Korean representation to all international conferences hereafter will be contended by the North Koreans and it is highly probable that we will have to send a North and South combined team to the coming Olympic Games in 1964. In other words, North-South exchange has become no longer avoidable. So the South Korean Government must change its course and stop opposing such measures.

It is altogether regrettable that the Government has again displayed its characteristics of servile nature, want of self-reliance and blindness to the currents of international politics. Although the Korean unification may be a problem depending greatly on international conditions, still, essentially, it's a problem to be determined by our ownselves. Yet the Government couldn't take the initiative and had

to be prod on by other nations.

On the eve of the Stevenson proposal, the Korean delegation persisted in its usual obstinate attitude and was absorbed in pleading its own cause; whereas the Government itself anticipated that no rough going would arise from the debate. But to their dismay, the situation changed overnight. And of all countries, the U.S. put forth such a drastic proposal.

Besides the far-sighted people, the public itself has antipated a situation like was bound to come. And we have called so many times to the Nation to take the initiative. We have also warned the North Koreans that if they should betray their own talks of unification and North-South exchanges, they will only serve the benefits of the South Korean Government.

The Government who is so slow in doing anything and only interested in clinging to its power to rule, have once again lost the confidence of the people and revealed its incompetent, servile and reactionary nature.

As we have said so often, the unification problem must not be used as means to serve the greedy ruling class.

The people's will for unification is no longer a matter of righteousness but of existence. The patriotic spirit of the people wishes to enliven the Korean nation into a full-fledged member of the free and democratic society of nations. If the Government does not throw away its servile and reactionary attitude, it will be forsaken by the people in due time.

WHAT THE U.N. POLITICAL COMMITTEE RESOLUTION TO INVITE BOTH KOREAS MEANS TO THE KOREAN PEOPLE

SEOUL SHINMUN

(*Pro-government*) April 15, 1961

The U.S. ammendment on the Indonesian draft resolution to invite both Koreas to the U.N. debate submitted by the U.S. Chief Delegate Adlai E. Stevenson to the Political Committee on April 11th, was adopted by a majority of 59 to 14 votes. The essence of this proposal is to invite the North Koreans to the debate provided they will accept the competence and authority of the U.N. to deal with the Korean Question. And since the U.N. has heretofore branded the North Koreans as aggressors, all the participants in the Committee debate was taken by surprise.

We have already pointed out that this was a situation bound to come sooner or later and there is no reason for us to get so excited. Yet to see so much excitement and confusion going on is quite regrettable. Therefore, we must once more, warn the politicians and the public at large to regain their composure and get back to the work of creating a national united front.

Sharp words were exchanged between New Democratic Representative Kim Do-youn and Prime Minister Chang in the House plenary session debate on the 14th. It became clear from this debate that the Government holds a very optimistic view in regards to the U.N. resolution. Chang stated that: "this resolution has actually cornered the North Koreans, for they are hardly in a position to accept such an invitation" and claimed that this was a diplomatic victory to South Korea and the Free countries. In direct contrast to this, the New Democrat expressed a totally pessimistic view. Kim asserted that the adoption of the resolution, on the contrary, has clearly revealed the passivity of South Korean diplomacy and brought the nation to a stage where our independent unification plan will be completely ignored. We, however do not agree to either views.

The foreign wires described the U.S.

(Continued on Page 58)

PROPOSALS FOR KOREAN UNIFICATION

In Chronological Order for Reference Data

1943

Dec. Cairo Declaration issued by Heads of the United States, United Kingdom and Republic of China Governments. U.S., United Kingdom and Republic of China regarding the servitude state of the Korean people, decided that Korea should become free and independent.

1945

Dec. 27 Moscow Agreement reached by Foreign Ministers of U.S., United Kingdom and U.S.S.R.:

1) A Provisional Government shall be set up in Korea with the aims of creating the conditions for reconstructing Korea as an independent nation, developing the nation in accordance with democratic principles and wiping out the harmful effects left by the long Japanese rule. This Government shall consider all measures necessary in developing Korean industry, transportation, agriculture and national culture of the Korean people.

2) In order to assist in organizing the Provisional Democratic Government of Korea and to prepare the adequate measures beforehand, a Joint Commission shall be established represented by delegates of U.S. Occupation Forces in South Korea and Soviet Occupation Forces in North Korea. In working out proposals, the Commission must consult the various democratic political parties and civil organizations of Korea. The proposals prepared by the Commission shall be subject to review by the Governments of the U.S., United Kingdom, Republic of China and U.S.S.R. before final decision is set by the Governments of U.S. and U.S.S.R.

3) The Commission shall be given the task to prepare measures to assist and co-operate (trusteeship) in promoting the political and economical and social progress of the Korean people; the development of democratic self-government in Korea; and the establishment of Korean national independence by inviting the co-operation of democratic political parties and civil organizations of Korea. The Commission in consultation with the Provisional Government of Korea shall prepare proposals for working out a Korean Trusteeship Agreement of Five Years under the Four Powers. This Agreement shall be reviewed by the Governments of U.S., United Kingdom, China and Soviet Union.

4) For the purpose of reviewing urgent problems concerning North and South Korea and preparing measures to establish permanent adjustment of the administrative and economic problems lying between the U.S. Military Command in South Korea and the Soviet Military Command in North Korea, a conference of delegates from both Commands shall be convened within two weeks.

1947

Nov. 14 Resolution adopted by the Second Session of the United Nations General Assembly:

1) The United Nations General Assembly recognizing the Korean Nation's immediate and rightful demands for independence, will establish a United Nations Korean Mission for the purpose of supervising fair elections in Korea.

2) A government will be organized through general elections executed under the supervision of the U.N. Korean Commission through secret votes

and proportional representation to the population.

3) The new Government in co-operation with the Commission will

A. Organize a United Nations Security Force.

B. Assume the administrative functions from the Military and Civil Administration Authorities of North and South Korea.

C. Negotiate with the Occupation Authorities and take measures to prompt immediate and complete evacuation of the occupation forces possibly in 90 days.

(Note) Among 57 member nations, 43 voted in favor;0 against; 6 abstaining and 8 absent.

1948

April 23 The Joint North-South Conference of Delegates from Political parties and civil organizations decided:

1) To smash the reactionary elections of South Korea.

2) To accelerate the withdrawal of foreign armed forces.

3) To confirm the principle of national self-determination.

May 10 General elections were held in South Korea under the supervision of the United Nations.

(Note) The United Nations Korean Commission with the purpose of supervising the North and South Korean general elections ran up against Soviet rejection and could not enter North Korea. And since the "Joint Conference of North and South Korean Political Parties and Civil Organizations" rejected the May 10th elections, general elections were held only in South Korea.

1949

June 7 Appeal adopted by the Korean adopted at the formation rally of the "Korean Unification Democratic Front":

1) The unification shall be carried out by the Koreans themselves.

2) U.S. Occupation Forces and the United Nations Korean Commission shall evacuate Korea at once.

3) All-Korea general elections shall be held with the purpose of electing a legislative body.

4) Election Administration Committee shall be formed by representatives from political parties and civil organizations of North and South Korea.

5) Measures shall be taken in order to guarantee free general elections.

6) A elections Guidance Committee shall provide the necessary instructions for organization and enforcement of the elections to the present North and South Korean Governments. It will also forma Foreign Forces Evacuation Observation Commission and administer direct control over the police forces of North and South Korea.

7) The Legislature elected by the General Elections shall adopt a constitution for the Korean Republic and form a new Government which will assume the administrative powers from the North and South Korean Governments.

8) The new Government shall unite the armed forces of both Koreas.

Oct. 17 Protest sent by North Korean Foreign Minister Pak Heun-Yoeng to the U.N. General Assembly President and U.N. Secretary General:

1) The unification of Korea must not be intervened by any agency of the United Nations and shall be executed through the unification plan adopted by the Korean Unification Democratic Front.

2) The Democratic People's Republic of Korea's Government declares that any decision on the Korean Question passed without the participation of the true Korean people's delegation is completely invalid.

1950

June 7 Appeal adopted by the Korean Unification Democratic Front:

1) General Elections shall be held from August 5 to 8, 1950 to set up the highest legislative body.

2) For the purpose of discussing and deciding on all the conditions and pro-

cedures necessary for peaceful unification, a Conference of delegations from all the political parties and civil organizations of North and South Korea shall be held in either Kaeseong or Haeju from June 15 to 17, 1950.

3) As to the political parties, the Great Korean Nationalist Party and the Democratic Nationalist Party will be excluded.

(Note) The exclusion of these two South Korean parties from the proposed North-South Conference was a significant action.

June 19 Proposal to be sent to the ROK Assembly was adopted by the Permanent Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly: The Supreme People's Assembly of North Korea and the National Assembly of South Korea shall be united into a single legislative body.

June 25 Outbreak of the Korean War. Unification of Korea went up on the rocks.

1953

July 27 Armistice Agreement signed.

Dec. 23 South Korean President Syngman Rhee issues statement:

1) North Korea alone should hold general elections to supplement the remaining seats of the ROK National Assembly.

2) However, if the North Koreans should demand so, ROK is ready to agree on an All-Korea general elections.

(Note) This statement was the first ROK Government proposal for unification after the Armistice.

1954

Unification Formulas presented at the 1954 Geneva Conference

April 9 Proposal submitted by North Korean Foreign Minister Nam Il:

A. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea with the purpose of establishing a unified nation, proposes the following:

1) To hold general elections to form a National Assembly which will establish a unified government.

2) To organize an "All-Korea Committee" composed of delegates elected by the Supreme People's Assembly of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea, respectively, which will organize and execute the general elections as well as take measures to promote close economic and cultural relationships between North and South Korea.

3) All-Korea Committee shall draw up a draft election law.

4) All-Korea Committee shall take immediate measures to establish free economic and cultural interchange as well as exchange of travel and letters between North and South Korea.

5) To organize a Neutral Elections Supervision Commission which will supervise the elections.

B. All foreign armed forces must evacuate Korea within six months.

C. All powers interested in maintaining peace in the Far East must realize the necessity to work out and provide the necessary conditions to bring about an immediate resolution of the Korean Unification Question.

(Note) The keynote here is the proposal to organize All-Korea Committee.

May 22 Plan proposed by ROK Foreign Minister, Byen Yeong-Tae:

1) For the purpose of establishing a united, independent and democratic Korea, free elections shall be held under the supervision of the United Nations in accordance with the Resolutions adopted by the U.N.

2) Free elections shall be held in South Korea and also in North Korea where such elections have not been held heretofore, in accordance with the procedures provided in the ROK Constitution.

3) Elections shall be executed within six months after the adoption of this proposal.

4) The U.N. Elections Supervision Commission which will supervize the

elections, shall be given, prior to, during and after elections, complete freedom of speech and action in order to supervize and create the necessary conditions to maintain a free atmosphere throughout the election area And the local authorities shall provide all possible facilities to the Commission.

5) The candidates, their agents and family members shall enjoy prior to, during and after the elections, full freedom of conduct, speech and all other fundamental rights recognized and guaranteed by the democratic nations.

6) Elections shall be executed based on secret votes and universal adult suffrage.

7) The number of representatives to constitute the All-Korea National Assembly shall be elected in proportion to the population of All-Korea.

8) In order to allot the number of representatives accurately in proportion to the population of electoral districts, a population census shall be performed under the supervision of the United Nations.

9) All-Korea National Assembly shall commence immediately after the elections in Seoul.

10) The following questions shall be decided on after commencement of the National Assembly:

A) The questions whether to elect a new President for Unified Korea.

B) The question to amend the present Constitution of the Republic of Korea.

C) The question to dissolve the armed forces.

11) The present Constitution of the Republic of Korea shall be continuously effective unless amended by the National Assembly.

12) The Communist Chinese Army must complete its withdrawal from Korea one month in advance of the election date.

13) The gradual evacuation of the United Nations Forces should commense prior to the election date, but must not be completed until the United Korean Government establishes effective control over all Korea and the United Nations can prove such control.

14) The authority and independence of united, independent and democratic Korea must be guaranteed by the United Nations.

June 5 Proposal submitted by the Soviet Delegation:

1) Free elections shall be held thoroughout the entire Korean territory for the purpose of unifying Korea and establishing an independent, democratic Korean Government. The elections shall be executed within six months after the said agreement is reached. The elections shall also be based on secret ballots and universal suffrage. The representatives for All-Korea legislature shall be elected in proportion to the population of entire Korea.

2) A Government composed by delegates from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea shall be established for the purpose of organizing and executing All-Korea free elections and promoting the reconciliation of the two nations. The composition and functions of this Government are main subjects requiring further examinations.

3) All foreign armed forces must evacuate Korea within the agreed period. The periods and stages by which all the foreign armed forces shall evacuate North and South Korea prior to the holding of the elections are also main subjects to be examined hereafter.

4) The composition of the International Commission to supervise the execution of the All-Korea free elections is another question to be discussed.

5) Realizing the necessity to prevent any aggression on Korean peace, it is necessary that all the nations directly interested in the maintenance of peace in the Far East assume the responsibi-

lities to guarantee the peaceful development of Korea in order to promote the resolution of her unification question. As to which nations possess such responsibility are questions to be examined.

June 22 The Democratic People's Republic of Korea proposed at the Geneva Conference, a practical six-point Korean unification plan including such measures as complete evacuation of all foreign armed forces and cutting the armies of both Koreas down to 100,000 men.

Oct. 30 Appeal adopted by the 11th Session of the Supreme People's Assembly, which proposed:

1) For the purpose of discussing the peaceful unification problem, to call a Joint Conference of delegates from all political parties, civil organizations and all other fields and circles of North and South Korea, or a Joint Conference of the Supreme People's Assembly of North Korea and the National Assembly of South Korea during 1955 at Pyongyang or Seoul.
2) For the purpose of discussing the problem of convening the said conference and the problem of opening the economic and cultural interchange and exchange of trade, travel and letters, to hold a conference of delegates from both Koreas.
3) Patriotic people of all political parties, civil organizations and every fields and circles of North and South Korea must exchange communications and mutual contact in order to work out measures for peaceful unification. The North and South Korean Government authorities must guarantee the free activities of these people throughout the territory.

1955

Feb. 15 Declaration promoting unification was issued by the Council for Promoting Korean Unification (Korean civilian organization in Japan):

1) From the standpoint of the Korean nation as a whole, to unite in order to promote the unification and independence of the fatherland.
2) A United Central Government must be established through free general elections throughout the country.
3) The free general elections and the unification and independence of the fatherland must be guaranteed internationally.

(Note) The Council for Promoting Korean Unification drew attention as the first Korean organization in Japan to commence a movement to promote peaceful unification of Korea.

1956

April 28 Declaration was adopted by the 3rd National Congress of the Korean Workers' Party:

1) The Unified Government of Korea must be established through general elections participated by the entire Korean people.
2) In order to realize peaceful unification, the results of the Armistice must be mobilized towards strengthening peace.
3) In order to realize peaceful unification, full manifestation of sincere and positive patriotism is required. And for that, the principles of democracy must be realized universally in the social and political life of South Korea and the livelihood of the South Korean people at large must be stabilized and improved.
4) In order to promote peaceful unification, the unnatural walls existing between North and South Korea must be cleared and mutual contact and entente between the people of North and South Korea must be established.
5) The joint struggle against the American Imperialists and the enemy of peaceful unification must be strengthened.
6) International agreement must be concluded to maintain peace in Korea and to peacefully resolve the Korean Question.

(Note) The point that conclusion of an international agreement was proposed for peaceful resolution of the Korean

Question is notable.

June 2 Statement was issued by North Korean Foreign Minister, Nam Il.

He called for an international conference to discuss the withdrawal of all foreign armed forces from the whole Korean territory and the peaceful unification problem.

(Note) What is noticeable here is that an international conference was called for to discuss the peaceful unification problem.

July 3 Declaration was issued by the Council for Promoting Peaceful Unification:

1) The Korean people will oust all subjugation and intervention and will hold steadfast the spirit of freedom and independence.
2) Peaceful unification must be realized.
3) We must create mutual contact and understanding between North and South Korea and realize exchange of letters, travel, trade, culture, art and science between both Koreas.
4) We must establish a permanent body constituted by representatives of North and South Korean Government, National Assemblies, political parties, civil organizations and patriots, and having the purpose of discussing the peaceful unification problem.
5) We must also establish a United Democratic Government through All-Korea general elections.
6) We call for the co-operation of the nations concerned, to promote the peaceful resolution of the Korean Question.

(Note) The characteristic notable here is that a set up of a permanent body constituted by representatives of all fields and circles of both Koreas was called for in order to discuss the peaceful unification problem.

Nov. 7 Message to the ROK House of Representatives and all circles of South Korea was adopted by the 12th Session of the Supreme People's Assembly:

1) In order to bring about a peaceful unification, foreign armed forces must evacuate Korea.
2) People's Assembly supports the holding of North-South disarmament conference.
3) We must keep the campaign to change the present armistice state into a really peaceful state going.
4) In order to realize these plans, the Supreme People's Assembly proposes to meet the members of the ROK National Assembly or any individuals at once and at any place.

1957

Sept. Unification plan proposed by the South Korean Progressive Party

(Leader: Cho Bong-Am):

1) Free elections shall be held for the purpose of forming a national Assembly of unified, independent and democratic Korea.
2) For the purpose of supervising and observing the preparation and enforcement of the elections, an International Supervision Commission formed by delegates recognized by the United Nations shall be set up. This Commission must be given practical and effective powers for supervision, and should be formed by delegates of India, Sweden, Poland, Czechoslavakia, with the Indian delegate acting as chairman.
3) In preparing and enforcing the elections, an All-Korea Committee represented by delegates elected by ROK Assembly and North Korean authorities, shall be established for the purpose of devising measures for political contacts between North and South Korea in relation to free general elections, in co-operation with the International Supervision Commission. This Committee may include representatives of North and South Korean civil organizations possessing various political tendencies.
4) All-Korea Committee shall be steered according to the principles of mutu-

al agreement by both North and South Korea but it must not intervene in those problems that the Unified National Assembly should deal with, and also those problems that would arise in the transition period before and after the elections but should be dealt with by the ROK Government or North Korean authorities since having no direct relations. The Committee's pending task is to prepare an election law that will enable the free elections to ensure a true democracy and create a free election atmospher.

5) When the All-Korea Committee cannot reach agreement after discussion on a matter under its jurisdiction, it must request the arbitration of the International Supervision Commission Chairman and resolve the matter according to the Commission's recommendation.

6) The ROK Government and the North Korean authorities must execute with responsibility the decisions reached by the Committee.

7) Elections will be held within 6 months after agreement is reached on by the authorities concerned.

8) The International Supervision Commission which will participate in administrating the elections, shall be assured, prior to, during and after the elections, freedom of conduct and speech in order to observe the situation and the local authorities must provide the Commission of all possilbe facilities.

9) All candidates, their agents and their family members shall enjoy, prior to, during the after the elections, freedom of conduct and speech and all other human rights recognized and quaranteed by democratic nations.

10) The elections shall be held through the principles of proportional representation, secret vote and universal adult suffrage.

11) All-Korea National Assembly shall be convened immediately after the elections in Seoul.

12) The following are problems which the All-Korea Committee shall especially decide on:

A) Problems pertaining to the preparation of the Constitution of Unified Korea.

B) Problems relating to the evacuation of foreign armed forces.

13) When the elections for unification is agreed on, the evacuation of foreign armed forces shall begin prior to the elections according to proportional basis and the dead line of complete evacuation of the United Nations Forces must not be decided until a unified Government is established and security duties have been assumed by that

14) Foreign nations including those powers who are responsible in guaranteeing the peace and reconstruction of unified, independent and democratic Korea, should assist in steadily advancing the peaceful unification of Korea.

Sept. 20 North Korean Premier, Kim Il Sung, addressed the 1st Session of the 2nd Supreme People's Assembly and called for:

1) All foreign armed forces must evacuate Korea and both North and South Korea should reduce 100,000 men from their armies.

2) Immediate measures must be taken in order to realize free travel of civilians, exchange of letters and cultural interchange between both Koreas.

3) An International Conference of nations concerned should be convened at once to seek a peaceful adjustment of the Korean Question.

4) All-Korea general elections must be held according to universal, peaceful, direct and secret vote for the purpose of unifying North and South Korea.

1958

Feb. 5 Statement issued by the North Korean Government:

1) In order to relieve the tensions in Korea and to resolve the Korean Ques-

tion peacefully, all foreign forces must evacuate Korea.

2) After evacuation of the foreign armed forces, All-Korea general elections must be held in a set period.

3) North-South negotiations based on equality must be opened at once for the purpose of discussing the problems connected with economic and cultural interchange between North and South Korea, and with All-Korea general elections.

4) The Democratic People's Republic of Korea has recently reduced 80,000 men from its army, and hereafter North and South Korea must reduce their armed forces to the minimum level as soon as possible.

Feb. 19 Joint Communique issued by North Korea and Communist Chinese Government:

The Chinese People's Voluntary Army will evacuate North Korea during 1958.

1959

Oct. 26 North Korean Vice Premier, Nam Il addressed the 6th Session of the 2nd Supreme People's Assembly and proposed:

1) All foreign forces must evacuate Korea.

2) North and South Korean Armed forces must be cut down to 100,000 men each.

3) North and South Korean authorities must mutually renounce the use of force.

4) All-Korea free elections shall be held after all foreign armed forces evacuate Korea.

5) A permanent committee constituted by representatives of North and South Korean National Assemblies, Government and political and civil organizations shall be established for the purpose of discussing the problems in connection with peaceful unification including the problem of executing All-Korea free elections.

7) A permanent North-South Committee shall be organized to discuss economic development and interchange represented by business delegates of both Koreas.

(Note) The point notable here is the proposals calling for both Koreas to renounce the use of force against each other and that a permanent committee for economic development and interchange is to be organized prior to All-Korea general elections.

Dec. 9 Resolution was adopted by the 14th Session of the U.N. General Assembly:

1) U.N. General Assembly reconfirmed that the United Nations' objective in Korea is to realize a democratic Korea to be unified peacefully into a single independent representative government and to fully restore the international peace and safety in Korea.

2) U.N. General Assembly requested the Communist authorities concerned to accept the United Nations objective to realize the stability of Korea in accordance with the basic principles for unification, proposed at the Geneva Conference and reconfirmed by the U.N. General Assembly and in accordance with the principles approved by the U.N. to execute free elections within a short time.

3) Requested the U.N. Korean Unification and Rehabilitation Commission to continue its projects in accordance with the U.N. resolutions.

4) Requested the Secretary General to include the Korean Question in the U.N. General Assembly's provisional agenda.

(Note) Among 82 member nations, 54 voted in favor; 9 against; 18 abstained and 1 absent.

Aug. 21 Unification plan issued by the Korean Unification Research Institute (Civilian organization in Japan):

1) It proposed to hold free general elections throughout the North and South Korean area for the purpose of establishing unified, independent and

democratic Korea.

2) Elections must be held according to the principles of proportionate representation, secret votes and universal suffrage.

3) Such elections shall be held within 6 months after agreement is reached.

4) The All-Korea Assembly to be elected through the elections must be convened immediately after the elections in Seoul. And under the premises that the above proposals are realized, the Institute proposed the following unification plan:

A) Called for an International Conference succeeding the Political Conference on the Korean Question held in 1954 at Geneva to push forward the results of that Conference and bring about the resolution of the Korean unification problem.

B) In addition to the participant nations of the Political Conference, the 4 nations of the Korean Armistice Observation Commission (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Sweden, Switzerland) and India shall participate in the proposed Conference.

C) To set up All-Korea Committee that shall draw up an election law based on the conditions decided by the International Conference, and organize and enforce general elections for unification. This Committee shall be organized by equal representation by delegates elected in proportion to the political powers constituting the National Assemblies of North and South Korea.

D) To establish an International Supervision Commission to guide and supervise the elections. This Commission shall be constituted by nations that did not participate in the Korean War, selected by the above International Conference and approved by the United Nations.

E) The foreign armed forces stationed in Korea shall be relieved by an International Police Force and evacuate before the elections. This force shall be formed with troops from non-participant nations of the Korean War; shall be entrusted the tasks to secure the peace and observe fair execution of the elections and will not evacuate until requested by the Unified Government.

F) The participant nations of the International Conference shall possess the responsibility to guarantee the peaceful development of Unified Korea and must recommend the United Nations to acknowledge this responsibility. The United States, the Soviet Union and other participating nations at this Conference shall pledge that they will assist in the reconstruction of Korea, observing the conditions of non-intervention in the internal affairs of Unified Korea and of not using Korea as military bases. Finally they shall recommend Unified Korea's membership to the U.N., and through that organization shall guarantee the security of Unified Korea.

(Note) In 1959, the Liberal Party led by Syngman Rhee called for unification by "marching North with force".

1960

April 21 Plans submitted at the Joint Conference of leaders of North ~~and South~~ Korean political parties, and civil organizations:

1) All American Armed Forces must evacuate South Korea at once.

2) To hold a joint convention of North and South Korean political parties and civil organizations to discuss the unication problem.

3) To immediately realize free travel and exchange of letters between both Koreas.

4) To form a North-South Korea Joint Economic Committee with business delegates from both Koreas.

5) To hold All-Korea general elections without intervention of any foreign power and in accordance with the will of the entire Korean people.

(Note) The previous demands to or-

ganize a neutral elections supervision commission and to convene an international conference are not included here but the call for ousting foreign internation is notable.

June 17 Proclamation of the Aims of the Socialist Popular Party on its inauguration:

1) To realize peaceful unification of the country through co-operation with the United Nations and under conditions that victory of democracy can be secured.

2) The decampment of Kim Il Sung and his Party is prerequisite to any unification plan.

3) Will not by any means, compromise with fraudulent unification plans of the Communists.

4) Hope that a national supra-partisan foreign policy will be executed in unifying the nation.

Aug. 14 North Korean Premier Kim Il Sung made a speech at August 15th Liberation Day Rally and proposed:

1) To execute All-Korea free elections based on the principles of non-intervention of any foreign power and of democracy.

2) If the South Korean authorities cannot still accept free general elections, will propose, as a gradual measure, to establish a federation of North and South Korea. (Leave the present political systems of both countries as it is; guarantee independent activities of both Governments; and at the same time, organize a Supreme National Assembly composed of representatives of both Governments which will assume the task to adjust the unified development of economy and culture of both Koreas.)

3) If the South Korean authorities cannot agree on the above proposals, will propose organizing a purely economic committee constituted by delegates of North and South Korean business circles.

4) Will propose again to interchange cultural missions and exchange sciences, culture, art, sports between both countries.

5) Demanded the evacuation of all U.S. Armed Forces from Korea and also proposed to cut the North and South Korean armed forces down to 100,000 men or less.

6) For the purpose of negotiating on the above problems, proposed to the South Korean authorities, political parties, civil organizations and individuals to hold a conference of North and South delegations at Pyongyang, Seoul or Panmunjom.

(Note) The characteristic notable here is that federation formula was proposed as a gradual step to unification.

Aug. 27 Inauguration speech of South Korean Premier, Chang Myun.

Endorsing the United Nations' peaceful unification formula, Chang clarified his position to execute general elections throughout North and South Korea under United Nations' supervision and in accordance with the U.N. resolutions.

Oct. Statement issued by South Korean Foreign Minister Chyung Yil-hying:

1) Peaceful unification.

2) General elections shall be held throughout North and South Korea, supervised by the United Nations and in accordance with the procedures provided in the ROK Constitution.

Oct. 5 Statement by U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman William Fullbright:

Korea should be unified through voluntary actions of the Korean people without being influenced by foreign powers. A good method is to accomplish this through free general elections assisted by U.N. supervision.

Oct. 22 Formula suggested by U.S. Senator, Mike Mansfield:

We must seriously examine the possibility of resolving the Korean unification problem through neutralization after the pattern of Austria.

(Note) Austria was given her independence through the signing of the Austrian State Peace Treaty, And by this Treaty, Austria was declared a permanent neutral power, renouncing possession, production and experimentation of nuclear and mass destruction weapons and in returns, the occupation forces of the Big Four (U.S. Great Britain, France and Soviet Union) evacuated Austria.

Nov. 1 Protest resolution against the Government adopted by the Student's National Unification League of Seoul University:

1) The older generation in full realization of their moral obligations of bringing about the tragedy of North and South division, must acknowledge that they have no rights to ignore or suppress the rightful demands of the new generation for national reunification.

2) All the political parties and social organizations of South Korea should throw off their defeatism completely and set up a joint organization to prepare for All-Korea general elections.

3) In relation to the unification problem, the Government should change over to positive diplomacy based on reality. As a part of such diplomacy, Prime Minister Chang should visit the United States and the Soviet Union and talk with their leaders on the unification problem.

4) Exchange of letters which is a fundamental right guaranteed in the World Declaration of Human Rights, must be realized at once between North and South Korea.

Nov. 2 Resolution adopted by the 5th ROK Assembly:

In accordance with the United Nations' basic principles to establish a united, independent and democratic Korea, the Assembly shall examine the measures which will guarantee the safety of the Korean nation and government, permanently and firmly, and execute free elections, electing representatives in proportion to the population and under the supervision of the United Nations.

Nov. 19 Federation formula proposed by President of the Supreme People's Assembly, Tse Yong-Kuen:

This proposal modified the plan put fourth by Premier Kim Il Sung on Aug. 14.

Nov. Statement by Indian Chief Delegate to U.N. Mr. Menon:

Menon stated that he was preparing a resolution calling for a neutralization of Korea and general elections for unification of Korea supervised by neutral powers to be submitted to the 15th Session of the U.N. General Assembly's re-opening of the Korean Question Debate in December 1960.

Dec. 27 Statement issued by Preparatory Committee of The Central Council for Independent National Unification.

This Committee issued a statement requesting the ROK Government to realize exchange of letters and economic and cultural interchange between North and South Korea.

(Note) This Committee was the first organization in South Korea to propose trade between both Koreas.

1961

Jan. 5 New Democratic Party Representative, Jeong He-Yoeng proposed despatching a business inspection mission to North Korea.

Jan. 9 Institute for Unification Problem Research set up by the ROK Government.

The Government set up a Unification Problem Research Institute with aims to build up an anti-communist united Korea.

Jan. 10 Unification Problem Research Committee set up by the ROK Residents Union (Mindan: South Korean residents organization in Japan).

On setting up this Committee, Mindan called for All-Korea elections to be executed in a free atmosphere. supervised by newly independent nations having no interest in Korea.

Feb. 24 Report on Korea issued by the

U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee:

1) It justified the present North-South division of Korea.
2) Under the present conditions, there exists no possibility of unifying Korea.
3) The two Governments would continue to exist for a considerable time.

Feb. 25 Resolution adopted on the inauguration of the Council for Promoting Independent National Unification:

1) To crush all anti-unification forces.
2) Realize exchange of letters and economic interchange between both Koreas.
3) Realize exchange of news reporters and inspection teams.
4) To sent combined teams of North and South Korean athletes to all international competitions.

March 6 Memorandum issued by the North Korean Government prior to the re-opening of the 15th Session of U.N. General Assembly.

For promoting and realizing unification of the fatherland, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea proposed:

1) To realize exchange of letters and economic exchange between North and South Korea.
2) To abolish the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea.
3) Withdrawal of U.S. Armed Forces from South Korea and non-intervention by foreign powers in Korea.
4) Unification of Korea must be realized through the independent spirit of the Korean people.

March 9 Rally of unification problem specialists held in Tokyo.

March 13 ROK House of Representative approved the Government plan for unification.

The plan endorsed U.N.-supervised All-Korea elections executed in accordance with procedures provided in the ROK Constitution.

March 15 Federation for Neutralization of Korea and the Council for Promoting Independent National Unification issued statements condemning the Governments Unification Plan.

Both organizations declared that internationally supervised elections are more welcomed and charged that the Government Plan was less realistic than the Syngman Rhee's unification-by-force plan.

March 16 ROK Governments White Paper on the Unification problem distributed to the United Nations member nations.

The Paper stated:

1) The responsibility of North-South division of Korea rests with the North Koreans.
2) Free elections for unification must be held throughout Korea, under the supervision of U.N., according to the principles of secret vote and proportionate representation.
3) The unification problem is a major problem confronting the United Nations.
4) The United Nations which is the guardian of freedom, justice and peace of all nations, must resolve the Korean Question through the resolutions and principles the organization has already adopted.
5) The United Nations also must fully recover and secure the stability, peace and security of Korea in line with the U.N. Charter.

PROFILE

SU SANG IL

75 Year Old Conservative-turned-Progressive Leader of the Korean Unification Movement

They call Su Sang Il, second oldest member of the ROK National Assembly, honorably the "Old Man." But in heart Su is no old man; for to everybody who would show anxiety for his age (75), he will retort: "No, even if I have to whip up my old bones, I'm going to keep up with the glorious reformist front." Still what is most fantastic about Su is that he joined the ranks of the socialists at the age of 70! Up till then, the Old Man was a big mainstay of the conservatives. To go from the right to the left at such an old age! Perhaps, there is no parallel to this socialist Representative Su, in the annals of any other country's parliamentary history.

When Su joined hands with Cho Bong-Am (Progressive leader who competed twice with Syngman Rhee for the Persidency; but was executed by the Rhee regime in late July of 1959 on false charges of spying for the Communists.) and formed the first post-Korean War reformist party (Progressive Party) in the autumn of 1955, the public was really taken aback. And certainly the public couldn't help it, for Su had up to then been a big figure among the conservatives. He had served as the Leader of the powerful Democratic Party; Chairman of its successor, the Democratic Nationalist Party and Chairman of the ROK Constitution Drafting Committee of the 1st National Assembly. And especially, he was looked on as the stanchest spokesman of the greedy landlord class.

But those who really knew him, fully understood why Old Man Su had to go over to the leftist camp. For, before half a year had passed since the first conservative Government led by President Syngman Rhee was formed, Su had already formed doubts about the conservatives in power. It might be more precise to say that his skepticism was developing earlier: during the period when he was drawing up the Constitution.



Su Sang Il

Serving as the Chairman of the Drafting Committee, Su advocated a complete responsible cabinet system. He believed that such a system alone would prevent emergence of dictatorship and thus safeguard the parliamentary system. He stuck to his guns but the odds were bigger. He has given us the inside story in an article carried in the first issue of the *Korea National Assembly News*. According to his accounts, the draft Constitution was scrapped on the eve it was to be sent to the Assembly plenary session. Syngman Rhee and the conservative party leaders who flocked around him came along and exercised their pressure, by which the responsible cabinet system was altered into a president-centered administrative system overnight. Thanks to this maneuvering, Rhee became the first President of the Republic and eventually ruled the country

for twelve long years. But the grave matter here was that these conservative leaders had betrayed their colleague Su, and they were to betray him more. In the spring of 1949, Su, hoping to save the nation from Rhee's dictatorship, presented to the Assembly a Constitution Ammendment Bill which sought to convert the president-centered system back into a responsible cabinet system. He went through a lot of trouble and pains to get this Bill into the Assembly, but Su's colleagues again sided with Rhee and turned the Ammendment Bill down. By the way, this Bill became the first and the last ammendment attempt made by the opposition throughout the 12 years of Rhee administration.

This gives us a good idea why Old Man Su became disgusted with the conservative leaders and well may he have brooded thoughts of bringing down the dictator by resorting to violent means. Although it is quite doubtful that Su had any direct connection in the ill-fated assasination plot that was conspired by doubtful characters, nevertheless, he was convicted and spent a year in jail before being paroled.

It was then that Old Man Su was reborn an old warrior and definitely decided to join the ranks of the leftists. He reminiscences his conversion like this: "I was nearing 70 when they put me in jail. But thanks to them, I grew 30 years younger. Those feelings which had lain dormant within me—the passions that I felt when I was thrown into prison for anti-Japanese actions 30 years ago, resurged inside me. For, there were around me, young men who were joyfully enduring the hardships and wrongs for the sake of their fatherland and there were many who were even dying for their nation. In these young men, I rediscovered myself. It became clear to me that the only road remaining for me to tread was to share the struggle with these youths. . ." "All I did see flocked around the conservative parties were old or middle-aged men who only clinge to the powerful; and the young men that came there only wanted good jobs or money. Nothing but greed, corruption and enervation existed there. But here the spirited youngsters were nobly crying for the reformation of the country in defiance of the cruel chains of dictatorship that bit into their flesh. . . It should be my duty to fight with these young men."

Once released from imprisonment, Old Man Su began associating himself with the progressives and particularly sought building a good relationship with Cho Bong-Am who had heretofore been his political enemy. He did not as yet part with the conservatives, for he displayed such kindness as to help his friend Chough Myung-Ok get elected to the House of Representatives by not only offering his own constituency to the friend but also serving as his campaign manager. But eventually the time for Su to part with the conservatives came.

This was in 1955. A big political event brought all the opposition parties, regardless of the left or the right, together to form a united front to fight the Liberal Party. In November of 1954, Syngman Rhee asked to be given the Presidency for a life-term. He wanted to secure his dictatorship. At first however, the National Assembly turned down the Constitution Ammendment Bill to ordain Syngman Rhee a life-term Presidency. But Rhee was no man to fall back at that. On the following day, the Rhee gang, in its typical tyrannic fashion, proclaimed that the Bill had been passed and went on to promulgate the Ammendment. This infuriated the opposition, and Su moved heaven and earth to unite the opposition front. But, despite such abusive violation of the Constitution, the conservative elements were reluctant to co-operate. They feared that the leftists would grab the leadership of the proposed new party and rejected the progressives like Cho Bong-Am to join. Su was literally enwrathed and at last, the Old Man left the conservatives.

So in co-operation with Cho Bong-Am, Su formed the Progressive Party. And having Su as one of its leaders, the party took on a much popular aspect. This is one of the distinguishing contributions Su

has done to the reformist movements in Korea. Still the bigger merit we should acknowledge is that Su was one of the first statesmen to call for "peaceful unification of Korea".

In forming the Progressive Party, Su insisted on placing "peaceful unification" at the top of the party programme. It was a time when Rhee's tyranny had reached its heights. All other unification plans besides Rhee's "march north with force" plan were certainly taboo. Still Su had the courage to dare Rhee's dictatorship and went on calling for peaceful unification. Cho Bong-Am, who is now revered as the martyr of the peaceful unification movement, couldn't have pressed his calls so far as he did if he had not been backed by Su.

Su established "peaceful unification" as the banner of the progressive forces. And his incomparable political tactics and influences pushed the movement far into the conservative camps. In the 1956 Presidential Elections, Su talked the opposition Democratic Party candidate, the late Shin Lek-Hi, into forming a coalition front with the Progressive Party and carry peaceful unification as its policy.

Since the death of Cho in 1959, unification movement in South Korea had only Su to look for leadership. And the Old Man skillfully pushed the drive ahead not only by his unique politicking but also by putting forth ever-new ideas to the people.

Returning to parliamentary politics after the April Revolution last year, Su at once combined such progressive forces like his own Democratic Reformist Party and the Progressive Party and created the United Socialist Party. And moving up his fight for unification, he added the call for unification through independent actions of the Korean people to his original peaceful unification plan. This was again radical for the times. Even the younger generation shunned the idea. On such accounts, he couldn't get the plan adopted by the new party but the old warrior was not to be discouraged. Running for the House of Representatives from the Taegu constituency in the July elections, Su campaigned throughout the grassroots and boldly called for North-South exchange of letters, trade and culture. The Old Man again created an uproar. The rightists condemned him a pro-red and his party members disgruntled that he would ruin the party's hopes by bringing on public wrath and suppressive actions of the Government. But the old warrior would not flinch. He retaliated: "We've waited 15 long years already. And still no unification. Therefore, we must find a way to realize this goal through the powers of our own nation. We can do it. Wasn't the April Revolution carried out by the people's own power? Well, what have we to wait for? We must at once open up contact and exchange with our fellow brethrens of North Korea and find out how we can unify Korea by our ownselves. This is our legitimate right. No one, not even the Big Powers, can deprive us of this right!"

Taegu, the Southern city where the April upheavals broke out last year, of course, elected the Old Man to the House with overwhelming odds. (Taegu is Su's home town. A youth hall which he erected long ago still stands there. He is revered as the pride of the city.) With the old warrior back in active politics, the unification movement has gained great momentum. His popularity is rallying vast support of the people behind him. This may be pleasing to him, but not until North and South Korea is united back into one Korea will this stanch old warrior lay down his arms.

DECLARATION OF UNIFICATION

Issued by the Central Council for Independent National Unification of Korea

The deep emotion and joy we experienced on our Liberation Day, August 15, 1945, were only a night's dream. During the fifteen years since, we have always been panting under the pressures of suppression and poverty, and to top it all, we had to go through that great tragedy in which the Korean people killed each other.

Although this was greatly due to accumulation of maladministration and lack of independent spirit on the people's part, still the greatest cause lied in the fact that both our territory and nation were split in two. Thus if we do not carry out the supreme command of the nation, that sacred task to unify the divided country, more hardships and national humiliation will await us and who can say that another tragedy like that of the Korean War shall not befall on us again?

The Korean people have but one fatherland. They are all of the same nation. Today, we see so many of our brethrens still living in sheer anxiety for their parents, wives and children from whom they have been parted so long. And in want of exchange between North and South Korea, all the businesses are shrinking. Now we have become a nation which has to live by foreign aids. But aids shall not continue forever, and we must not, by all means, degrade ourselves into a nation which has to rely on foreign aids forever. Without a self-sustaining economy, we will not have political freedom. And without political freedom, we will not have an independent nation.

Dictator Syngman Rhee advocated a fantastic plan to "march north with force" in order to prolong his own reign. And those politicians who sought only pomp and ease under the Rhee regime, put forth equally fantastic plans for unification and literally trampled on the calls for peaceful unification which was the demand of the times and only plan sensible internationally. In stride with the development of science, international situation is heading towards peaceful co-existence, and so many of the smaller nations are attaining their independence one after the other and joining the United Nations. How regretful it is, that we Koreans who have been a cultural nation with a history from so far-off past, cannot advance into the world stage as a unified and independent nation.

Those bloods that our patriots shed in the past and especially those that our youths shed in April, last year, were sacrificed for the sake of gaining complete independence, democratic progress and national prosperity for the fatherland. And in this spirit, we must fulfill our sacred task of unification as swiftly as we can.

We must not let the foreign powers influence us. We should endeavor to resolve the problem independently while asking for equitable assistances from the United States and The Soviet Union. Futhermore, we should not count on the sluggish Government, but through an all-out national movement, should encourage the Government as well as appeal to the United Nations and unfold a really broad movement for unification.

Thus we, delegates of political parties

and civil organizations and individuals, in preparing here to form a Central Council for Independent National Unification to call all the forces of the nation together, declare an Independent National Unification of North and South Korea in line with the "March 1st" spirit of independence.

Our Slogan: Entire nation under the Flag of the Council for Independent National Unification!

1) We aim to attain: Independent and peaceful unification of the nation.

2) We must call all the forces of the nation together!

3) We must further international friendship through national independence!

FORMATION OF THE CENTRAL COUNCIL FOR PROMOTING INDEPEMDEMT NATIONAL UNIFICATION

The Council for Promoting Independent National Unification was formed on Feb. 25, 1961. This Council has developed into the largest organized national movement with the aim to gain peaceful unification through the independent actions of the Korean people. This supra-partisan organization has gathered some 40 political parties and civil organizations under its wings. Some major organizations participating are: 1) Socialist Popular Party 2) Reformist Party 3) Socialist Party 4) Korean Independence Party 5) Korean Labor Party 6) Socialist Reformation Party 7) Populist Party 8) National Council Of Labor Unions 9) Democratic National Youths' League 10) Democratic Unification Youths' League 11) Seoul University National Unification League 12) Christian organizations 13) Buddhist societies, etc.

National Formation Rally of the Council for National Independent Unification held on Feb. 25 in Seoul

The Council adopted its Declaration, Programme, and Messages to be sent to various circles both home and abroad, at its National Formation Rally. The Declaration called for all the political parties, civil organizations and individuals to join their forces with the aim to realize national independent unification of Korea in line with the "March 1st Spirit of Independence" (see note) and stated its determination to shatter all the forces that perplex the people and obstruct the unification movements. And as preparatory steps to unification, the Declaration proposed:

1) Exchange of letters between North and South Korea.
2) North-South economic interchange.
3) Exchange of inspection teams and newsmen.
4) Sending combined teams to all international athletic meets.

(Note) On March 1, 1919, anti-Japanese independence uprising was staged throughout Korea.

The Council also adopted the following Resolution at this Rally:

RESOLUTION

1) We solemnly pledge to reject all servitude conducts that seek aid from foreign forces and to push on our struggle for unification accumulating all the forces of the nation.
2) We will thoroughly shatter all the forces that perplex the people and obstruct the unification movements by sabotaging unification or calling for 'reconstruction first, then unification.'
3) We demand participation in the United Nations Korean delegation for the purpose of reflecting the will of the whole nation on the United Nations General Assembly.
4) To prevent Korea becoming further prey of cold war politics, we request the United Nations, the United States and the Soviet Union to co-operate in bringing about immediate unification of Korea in accords with the basic spirit of the United Nations.
5) In order to prevent any damage on the people in the course of peaceful unification, we will enact such laws that shall abandon, after peaceful unification, all charges against political criminals who have committed offness prior to this National Rally.
6) We request the South Korean Government to put forth efforts to realize the following:
   a) To set up post-offices in the Neutral Zone and open up exchange of letters between North and South Korea.
   b) To promote North-South economic interchange.
   c) To establish a national friendship house in the Neutral Zone in order to enliven national spirit and brotherly love through mutual exchange.
   d) To exchange newsmen and civilian inspection teams for the purpose of consoling our relatives living in the North and of mutually observing the conditions of the country.
   e) To send combined teams to all international athletic meets.

MESSAGES

To the Secretary General of the United Nations

From the very far-off corners of the world, we hear today voices of peace-loving people singing in great chorus. And how could we Koreans close our ears to those songs of peace? We must, first of all, emphasize that the peaceful unification of Korea which is the precondition for the peace and prosperity of Korea, must be realized through the nation's independent capacities, in other words, through self-determination. We can no longer toler our fatherland which had always been united in one nation and one history, being held divided under the influences of the Big Powers. We strongly believe that Your Excellency and the United Nations will help us in realizing our aspiration for independent and peaceful unification of Korea.

If your Excellency and the United Nations are to make light of this appeal coming from this corner of the world, the peace of the world and the prosperity of mankind shall never be secured.

We, here, in the name of the entire Korean nation, appeal to your Excellency and the United Nations to extend us your active help and co-operation and also make the following requests:

1) Korea must be unified peacefully and reconstructed on democratic basis.
2) Unification and reconstruction must be carried out in accordance with the principle of self-determination.
3) As preparatory steps to unification, North and South Korean exchange of letters, trade and culture must be opened up at once.

To the President of the United States

We have learned about the difficult state of the United States' economy through the State of the Union Message which your Excellency presented to the Congress recently. Hearing your words and from the standpoint of furthering mutual trust and international friendship, we are, here, requesting your co-operation.

As your Excellency is concerned about the future of the United States, we too are worried about the future of our divided fatherland. We are thinking how we can realize unification of our fatherland and thus contribute to the peace of mankind in co-operation with our friendly free countries.

As your Excellency require various new plans in order to further the development of your country, we too really wish to resolve our unification problem by our own powers. The tragedy of having our fatherland and nation being split in two, have made us suffer so much. Thus now, determined to resolve our problem by ourselves and basing ourselves on the principle of self-determination, we are here unfolding an all-out national movement for independent unification and progress of our country in the sacred name of self-determination.

In the process of preparing and forming this Council for Promoting Independent National Unification, we have expressed our appreciation to your Chief Delegate to the United Nations, Mr. Stevenson for saying: "the Korean unification problem must be resolved through the Korean people's own powers." Without unification, we will not have a self-sustaining economy nor a complete national independence; nor can we keep in stride with the progress of the world. Such talks that claim Korea will be communized if unified, must be said downright gibberish of the Korean privileged classes who only wish to evade unification.

In order to realize our peaceful unification and further our national development, and from the standpoint of international equality, fundamental rights and humanity, we, here, ask for your co-operation and support in bringing about our national unification which is the supreme command of the Korean nation.

To the Premier of the Soviet Union

We are of the opinion that unification of Korea is being obstructed, because the numerous international activities which your Excellency is now carrying out in the name of peaceful co-existence, seem to be intended only for the sake of strengthening the Communist bloc. If your Excellency should go against the national struggles for liberation and reject sincere co-operation to our unification movement, we believe that you will be swimming against the currents of history.

In order to gain our political independence and to resolve all national problems by ourselves, and furthermore, to join the nations of the world in contributing to the progress of mankind, we must, first of all, realize unification of our fatherland. So in this sense, we request your Excellency to withdraw all your forces from our fatherland. Next, in order to make our economy self-sustaining and to eliminate poverty, and furthermore, to contribute to the world's productivity, we must attain unification. Thus we ask your Excellency to display reasonnableness and generosity in your political and economic activities.

In forming this Council for Promoting Independent National Unification through the free will of the Korean people and backed by the demands and support of all the smaller nations of the world, we are sending this message to your Excellency with hopes that you will abandon all your schemes to communize Korea and instead co-operate in the realization of Korean independent national unification.

North Korea Invited to U.N. Korean Debate

The U.N. Political Committee adopted a resolution to invite North Korea to attend its debate on the Korean Question on April 11th. This move stunned the world for it was the U.S. which had heretofore constantly opposed North Korean participation, that presented the proposal. The U.S. proposal, however, has a condition attached: The North Koreans will be invided provided they accept the competence and authority of the U.N. to deal with the Korean Question. It was in a form of a sub-ammendment on the Indonesian ammendment which invited both Koreas unconditionally.

These resolutions were put to the vote and the U.S. resolution alone was adopted by the Committee with a majority of 59 to 14 votes, with 23 nations abstaining. In view of the fact that only a month in precedence (early March), the U.S. State Department had reiterated its old stand on the Korean Question rapping the North Koreans incompetent and void of authority to deal with the unification problem, this move indicated a big turn in U.S. foreign policy.

Such change in U.S. policy seems rendered more by the movements of the Afro-Asian nations than by its own voluntary action. The Asian nations, at the beginning of the debates, declared that the basic U.S. resolution inviting South Korea alone, as in past years, will in no ways resolve the problem and requested inviting both Koreas since the two governments in Korea exist in de facto. And most of the Asian nations abstained from voting on the U.S. resolution.

Against speculations that they would turn down the invitation, the North Koreans accepted the resolution on April 17th. However they did not refrain from denouncing the condition put on the invitation, and called it unprecedented in U.N. history.

Meanwhile, the South Korean Government claimed that the adoption of the resolution was actually a victory for South Korean diplomacy. But this was considered nothing more than a bluff to curb the ever-mounting public desire for unification. For, soon Prime Minister Chang disclosed the real thoughts of the Government. He stated: "Although the Republic of Korea has in the past stood firmly by the U.N. resolutions, we hereafter will reject them if they should go against our interests. And if it's to be a unification in which we must put up with the Communists, we might as well stay divided."

The progressive parties and civil organizations of South Korea, however, took different views. They heartily welcomed the resolution and appraised it as a big step forward. The Socialist Party declared: "It's downright natural that both Koreas be invited if the U.N. is hoping to unify Korea peacefully." And the Korean presses, regardless of their political leanings, wrote in similar tones to the effect that: "What was bound to come has come."

The two Governments are now engaged in a verbal battle in relation to the condition attached to the North Korean invitation. The ROK Government claims that the North Koreans should first show their sincerity by allowing the U.N. Commission for Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea to enter North Korea and releasing the South Koreans they kidnapped during the Korean War. The North Korean Government has retaliated that the basic spirit of the United Nations has been distorted by the United States. This controversy around the U.S. condition is likely to develop into a hot debate at the next U.N. General Assembly.

Whether the North Koreans will go to New York or not is considered a key point in deciding the unification problem and great hopes are placed on the Afro-Asian efforts to bring this about.

North-South Student Conference

The Seoul University National Unification League, a student organization leading the drive for unification, again aroused the public by calling for a North-South student conference. This league was formed by Seoul University students on Nov. 1, last year, setting its goal for an independent unification, and it had been spearheading the movements in that direction.

Boosted by the recent favorable turn in the U.N. debate on the Korean Question, the League issued a statement on May 4, which called for: 1) immediate North-South student conference and 2) exchange of North-South student news reporters, academic debates, art, science, literature and athletic meets. On the following day, a National Students League for National Independent Unification was formed by students representing 17 major universities in South Korea which gave an enthusiastic support to the Seoul University proposal and adopted a resolution requesting that the North-South student conference be held during May at Panmunjom.

Through Radio Pyongyang, the North Korean Government, student leagues and every circle of that nation welcomed the South Korean student proposal at once. They declared in unison that such an exchange would undoubtedly serve as a break-through to unification. And the North Korean Home Minister Sok San promised guarantee of free travel and conduct and personal safety for the South Korean students and added that the ROK Government should do the same for North Korean students when they enter South Korea.

Meanwhile, in South Korea, progressive parties and civil organizations supporting the proposed student conference, held a rally on May 13 in front of the Seoul City Hall and urged the nation to accelerate its movements for independent unification.

Students demonstrating in Seoul

The ROK Government which regrets exchanging with the Communists, however, warned the students, through its spokesman, that it would strictly discipline any movements in that direction.

Enfuriated by this stubborn attitude of the Government, the South Korean students are bent on carrying out their resolution, so it's quite possible that another head-on student vs. government clash might ensue again.

New Democrats Shun Government Stand On Unification

Su Min-hoh, Vice Speaker of the ROK House of Representatives and leader of the powerful opposition New Democratic Party, declared during his recent sojourn in Japan that the U.N. centered unification plan of the ROK Government is no longer realistic and appealed to the Koreans to resolve the problem independently. The Vice Speaker stopped over in Tokyo on his return from the United Nations where he had attended the debate on the Korean Question as a member of the ROK delegation.

This statement by Su drew wide attention because the New Democrats had so far whole-heartedly supported the Gov-

ernment stand on the unification problem. And returning to Seoul, he has been continuing his calls for broad revision of the Government unification plan and opening of North-South negotiations. In support of Su, the New Democrat House Whip, Yang Il-Tang has rapped the Government plan which disregards negotiation with the North Koreans as bad as the unification-by-force plan of Syngman Rhee and proposed setting up a United Council of North and South Korean political parties and civil organizations.

Reports from Korea tell us that such shifts of policy in the conservative ranks is putting pressure on the Government to make changes and creating an atmosphere enabling open up of North-South exchange.

Korean Residents In Japan Active In North-South Exchange

The 600,000 Korean residents in Japan are leading the homeland in carrying out North-South exchange.

On March 1, North and South Korean businessmen and intellectuals residing in Japan met for the first time since Liberation 15 years ago, in Tokyo and putting aside differences in ideology, faiths and politics, discussed methods to realize an independent and peaceful unification of the fatherland.

On March 25 and 26, Korean journalists representing 18 publishers in Japan met in Tokyo and issued a joint statement requesting North-South exchange of news reporters.

On April 18, a North-South Joint Cultural Festival was held in Tokyo commemorating the first annniversary of the "April Revolution." Korean artists residing in Japan displayed colorful shows and exhibitions on music, dances, theatricals, art, photography and literature. And during the festival, the following appeal was issued.

1) We will put forth our joint efforts to realize an independent unification of Korea free from foreign intervention.

2) We will promote North-South cultural exchange and hold joint festivals on such memorial days as March 1 and August 15th to further the development of Korean culture.

In the meantime, some 200 North and South businessmen residing in Japan gathered in Tokyo on April 19 and issued the following statement:

North-South Joint Cultural Festival held by Korean residents in Japan on April 18 at Tokyo

North-South Exchange of Businessmen residing in Japan on April 19 at Tokyo

1) We will jointly work for the economic development of the fatherland.

2) We must promote North-South economic exchange.

3) We must help each other in securing the interests of Korean residents in Japan.

4) We must establish democracy in line with the spirit of the April Revolution.

These active North-South exchanges conducted by Korean residents in Japan is reported drawing wide attention in the homeland and especially giving momentum to the S. Korean people who are barred by government policy to open up North-South exchange.

(Continued from Page 35)

proposal a bombshell, but such a change in the U.S. foreign policy was expected to come about. It is, for one reason, because the balance of power within the United Nations has greatly shifted. The Western powers led by the U.S. can no longer maintain their numerical superiority as they have done throughout the past. And moreover, since John F. Kennedy took over the Presidency, U.S. foreign policy has taken, as pointed out by the N.Y. Times, a flexible course to recognize the neutralization tendencies in the so-called problem areas.

Thus this resolution was a thing bound to come about. So the next thing we should set ourselves ready for is to surmise the next stage that would ensue in the U.N. Korean debate and to take the lead in the free and peaceful unification movement by getting our united demands reflected on the U.N. It is clear that the North Koreans will not accept the resolution as it is, but if a more compromising proposal is put forth, the North Koreans might decide on going to New York. It must be noted that although the Communist bloc voted against the U.S. proposal, the neutrals that have always been working as the go-between of the two rival camps, like India, UAR and Nigeria, all abstained from voting.

The next stage that can be surmised is that a maneuver by these neutrals might succeed and a Korean neutralization plan be submitted. The fact that the Korean debate was suspended during the 15th Session and postponed till the next General Assembly indicates the possibility of such a proposal coming about. So we must keep an eve not only on the secret manuevers of the Communists but also on the movements of such neutral leaders as Nehru, Nasser and Nkrumah.

On the other hand, we cannot deny the immense bearings which the resolution will bring on the South Korean Government as regards its representation to international conferences. The U.S. State Department and our Government have clarified that the resolution in no ways meant a recognition of the North Korean Government. However the North Koreans will assert their rights to participate; and the difficulties which the South Korean Government will have to face at the international conferences, can well be anticipated. Therefore, what should be emphasized here is not the significance of the resolution but the urgent necessity to build up the national united front to deal with the oncoming situations.

REQUEST

We shall be very happy if the Reader can send us his comments and opinions on the Korean unification problem and our periodical. We shall also appreciate it, if the Reader can recommend us institutes, parties and individuals to whom we might send our magazine. (Editor)

ONE KOREA **EXTRA** June 5, 1961

THE TRUTH ABOUT S. KOREA'S MILITARY COUP D'ETAT

Power-Hungry militarists led by corrupt generals have seized the ROK Government. Incompetent as they are, the coup leaders are bent on enforcing iron rule. Democracy is being devastated. The U.N. Commission there to guarantee Korea's democratic progress is sitting idly by. The Korean people have once again been forsaken. Still, the militarists must remember that it was only yesterday that Dictator Rhee was overthrown!

The "Impossible" Occurred

The surprise takeover of the South Korean Government by ROK army troops on May 16th came as a shock to the world. The impact of the shock grew as the fast-moving Revolutionary Military Junta, set up by the coup leaders, brought Prime Minister Chang out from hiding to capitulate, dissolved the National Assembly, took control of all the governmental functions and made clear that it was set on ruling the country by guns and tanks.

The case was stunning because military coup d'etat was generally believed an "impossibility" in S. Korea. All ROK armed forces are placed under United Nations Command, so no ROK unit can be moved without the authorization of the U.N. commander. And on top of that, the United Nations Commission for Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) is there to look after and guarantee the democratic development of Korea. Nevertheless a coup d'etat was carried out in face of such authority and guarantee. The "impossible" occurred!

A Mere Handful of Soldiers

South Korea boasts an overburdening armed forces 4th in world rank. Among the 900,000 Korean troops (army, 700,000; navy and air force, 100,000 each), only 3,400 marines, paratroopers and artillery men pulled out from reserve positions in Kimpo and around Seoul, were used in seizing the capital.

the coup forces which called themselves the revolutionary army, moved into action at 3 A.M. of May 16. By 5 A.M. they had Seoul already in their hands. They had seized all key points like the Seoul Broadcasting Station, National Assembly, Metropolitan Police Headquarters, Defense Ministry, Home Affairs Ministry and Bando Hotel where Premier Chang kept his abode. The Revolutionary Military Junta was soon set up and its chairman, army chief of staff, Lt. Gen. Chang Do Yung announced through Radio Seoul that the coup had succeeded and the military was taking over the government with a six-point objective in mind to strengthen anti-Communism, further ROK-U.S. co-operation, root out corruption, raise living standards, etc.

The junta then proclaimed martial law under its control, rounded up the ministers of the Chang Cabinet and completed its in the country. Placed all armed forces takeover when Premier Chang came out of his hiding at an American official's residence and capitulated on May 18th. The junta was then enlarged into a 32 mem-

bered "Supreme Council for National Reconstruction" which at once got down to its work to solidify military rule and installed an all-military cabinet with the Lt. Gen. Chang as its premier.

Strange Attitudes Shown By The U.N. Command And The U.S.

Since all ROK forces are placed under the command and control of the U.N. commander, an action like this military coup could not be carried out, legally, unless authorized and supported by the U.N. commander. The situation being thus, there have been rumors circulating that the coup was, in fact, a sneak out on the U.N. Command.

The U. N. Command has some 20,000 U.S. troops stationed in and around Seoul. If the Command had thought it fit, it could have easily stemmed the coup at its very beginning. However, neither the U.N. Command nor the United States authorities did anything to counter the military rebellion. Besides a statement issued by U.S. Embassy Charge d'Affairs Marshall Green to the effect that the U.S. upheld its support of the Chang Government, both the U.S. and the U.N. Command just sat by and watched the developments, which eventually obliged them to recognize the coup d'etat as a *fait accompli.*

As to the UNCURK, it has kept mum all the way through. This Commission is supposed to look out for anti-democratic movements in Korea! But it hasn't spoken a word on the coup. Such negligence of duty is considered a matter that might bring international reproach on the Commission.

These strange attitudes shown by the U.N. and the U.S. authorities toward the coup has given rise to such doubts like something secret must have been going on behind the scenes.

Premier Chang Bitten By His Own Dog

According to highly reliable sources, the U.N. Command, on hearing the anti-Communism broadcast by Gen. Chang at the very outset of the military takeover, deemed that a joint action was being taken by Gen. Chang and Premier Chang to suppress the anti-government forces. It had, in fact, prior knowledge of such a plan being secretly prepared by the both Changs. So the Command decided just to look on instead of taking steps to reprimand the coup forces for defying the U.N. Command.

But in time Premier Chang got in a call from his hideout to the Command stating that he had nothing to do with this particular military action. So the U.S. Embassy hurriedly issued its statement backing the Chang Government. Nevertheless, the situation had developed beyond control and dangers of a civil war set in. Thus the U.S. and the U.N. Command had to forsake the Chang Government in exchange for preventing such catastrophe.

The story of Premier Chang's downfall is equally ironic. Speculating anti-government riots to break out in April when the first anniversary of last year's revolution would come, Premier Chang had planned as early as mid-February of using military forces to surmount the coming crisis. On Feb. 17, he replaced conscientious army chief of staff, Lt. Gen. Choe Kyong Nok and nominated Lt. Gen. Chang Do Yong, a fellow provincial, to that post. Gen. Chang's reputation was low at that time for he was being investiagted by a House Committee. (Seoul Shinmun, pro-Chang Government, Feb. 24th issue).

In answer to the premier's request, Gen. Chang made swift preparations, which were done so openly that angry cries arose within the Assembly condemning the army for "holding riot-breaking exercises with aims to quell riots that might break out in April." (Seoul Shinmun, Feb. 24 issue)

Despite such forebodings, the Chang Government fared the "April crisis" without any need of military help. This favorable wind to the government in turn plac-

ed Gen. Chang in an awkward and dangerous position. So the general had but to go on executing the original plan changing only the objective. Instead of bolstering the Chang Government, he brought it down. What irony! Premier Chang was bitten by his own dog.

Usurp Of The Government By Power-Hungry Militarists

What were the real motives of the coup? Many experts on Korea seem to be impressed that the army had risen because it could no longer toler the economic difficulties, political corruption and mounting of pro-Communist unification forces in S. Korea. And, of course, the coup leaders did not lose time in publicizing these points.

But such is far from the truth. For, firstly, it is a well known fact that the military leaders are the most corrupt in Korea. Secondly, the current economic difficulties is the result of too much spending on defense efforts. And thirdly, there exists no Communist force in present-day Korea and it's the usual political trickery of the rulers to brand campaigners for Korean unification as pro-Communists.

The political atmosphere too did not ask for anything like a military coup. The Chang Government had just got is new Budget passed and completed a cabinet reshuffle. The unification movements were on the ebb after reaching their heights during February and March. So, it is clear that the coup leaders just brazenly listed such causes in order to conceal their real motives.

Their real motives were none other than to conceal their own illicit deals and misconducts of the past and to usurp the government for the sake of satisfying their lust for power. As stated above, Gen. Chang, being investigated by the House Committee, was in great fear of getting fired at any moment. And Maj. Gen. Pak Chung Hi who is widely believed as the chief engineer of the coup, had been living in great resentment after transfer to an inferior post. So it did not take much time for these malcontents to come into concert for staging the military takeover.

Chang Do Yung: Ring-Leader Of Corruption

Now, what sort of man is this Lt. Gen. Chang who has grabbed the ruling reigns of the nation? In one word, the general himself is the most corrupt ring-leaders of the corrupt military chiefs. The first thing he did after assuming the office of army chief of staff, was to suspend the investigation of the corrupt generals. This is evidence enough to prove the point. Still, if the past misconducts of the general uncovered by the House Defense Committee were given here, they would best serve in showing the kind of man he is. Investigations have revealed the following:

1) During the Korean War, Gen. Chang, then chief of the Intelligence Bureau, amassed a big fortune through illicit trade deals with the North Koreans.

2) In the ill-famed 1960 Presidential Elections, taking advantage of his position as commander of the 2nd Army, he served the causes of Syngman Rhee by forcing his division commanders and CIC men to rig the elections.

3) Although married, he has two concubines.

4) Being in danger of getting sent into retirement after the April Revolution last year, he made big political contributions to a conservative party (likely the Democratic Party) and worked on Premier Chang to get his name off the retiring list.

Fraudulent Policies

Well may it be that a military junta led by such a corrupt figure should proclaim such undemocratic measures as suspension of the Constitution, enforcement of control on free speech and assembly and prohibition of all political activities. It would, be too much to expect anything drastic and

far-embracing to come from the junta, but the childish and fraudulent character of its policies is enough to dumbfound anyone with a little experience in state government.

The junta, on the one hand, has released Premier Chang whose government it had brought down on reasons of being corrupt; while on the other hand, it still detains some 6,000 progressive politicians who had heretofore been fighting the same corrupt regime! And what can the junta do for the 4 million unemployed? Nothing, except that the army is going to eat 33% more barley in place of rice and allot the balance to poverty-stricken people. It, then, says: "don't smoke American cigarettes", "no more dancing halls", "students must cut their hair short and wear close-buttoned uniforms". "It seems that the army is bent on restoring the old Japanese militarist ways.

Intra-Army Discord Bound To Come

Incompetent and unprincipled as the coup leaders are, all they care now is to keep their contenders down. Besides the progressives, they have put away a lot of able conservative statesmen and politicians in prison and have locked up such army officers as the former 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Army Commanders in jail. But such dictatorial tactics have never endured. Repulsion is bound to spring back at them and there are already signs of discord arising within the junta.

Maj. Gen. Pak: A Communist?

Wide speculation is going on now predicting that Maj. Gen. Pak would in due time replace Gen. Chang as chairman of the military junta and become the No. 1 man both in name and reality. In the meantime, there has been a rumor that calls Gen. Pak an ex-communist circulating too. But the general have never been a communist. He had a brother who was killed in the Taegu People's Incident of 1946. For this account, he was questioned in 1948 when army units rebelled at Ryu-soo, but was soon cleared and promoted to a key post in the following year.

Gen. Pak is a man of integrity rare among Korean military leaders and is widely respected by young officers. As reported, the general and his young officers had planned a coup d'etat of their own. They in fact constituted the central force of the coup. They collaborated with Gen. Chang out of common interest, but they are of different fibres. Gen. Chang will, most likely, labor to maintain his power by resorting to foreign powers, but Gen. Pak and his followers might seek a more nationalistic road. Herein, it could be said, lies the cause for discord to break out between the two factions.

Reaction Of The Korean People

At present, the Korean people are assuming a wait-and-see attitude in face of the severe crackdown policies and violent developments in the situation. However, opposition to the military junta is gradually mounting among Koreans residing abroad. The Korean ambassadors to Washington and the United Nations have resigned in protest against the coup. ROK students studying in Japan declared their opposition to the junta as early as May 27th and many Korean residents here in Japan have risen to fight the military dictatorship. It is believed that this new anti-military dictatorship struggle will gain momentum each day the dictatorship is prolonged. And the Korean people have set their goals on September when the U.N. General Assembly opens its 16th Session with aims to get the conscientious nations to urge the U.N. to do what it should do in Korea.

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